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I. INTRODUCTION 
Modernly, one will study the law of contracts as a homogeneous body of 
law.1  The conceptualization is helpful in creating an appearance of order, 
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1   See generally, e.g., James R. Gordley, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 452, 452-53 (1975) 
(reviewing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974)) (“Dean Langdell’s contribution 
was primarily to ‘launch the idea that there was—or should be—such a thing as a general theory 
of contract’ (pp. 13-14).  It remained for Holmes to present the theory in broad philosophical 
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allowing for the development of analytical frameworks.  The construct breaks 
down, however, on detailed inspection.  This article provides an illustration by 
examining aspects of the law governing corporate finance2—legal principles at the 
intersection of the law of contracts and corporation law.3 
This article examines the application of contract doctrine to corporate 
financing transactions to a number of ends.  First, it illustrates substantial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
outline, and later for Williston to elaborate the theory ‘in meticulous, although not always accurate, 
scholarly details’ (pp. 13-14).  After its brief flowering in the early twentieth century, the general 
theory of contracts weakened and proceeded to its ultimate collapse under the impact of new and 
vigorous principles of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel (pp. 55-85).”). 
2   The instruments examined in this article primarily comprise securities (stock and bonds), 
although some authority addressing credit agreements is also examined.  In this author’s 
experience, in large firms with transactional corporate practices representing those providing 
financing, these forms of financings are negotiated by different groups of lawyers.  Those lawyers 
representing investment banks in securities offerings typically do not represent banks in 
extensions of credit and vice versa, although on the borrower or issuer’s side, it may well be the 
same counsel.  Interpretative norms, insofar as they are co-extensive with practice groups, may 
vary between these two sets of instruments.  Cf. infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text 
(rejecting application of trade practice in bond market for purpose of construing preferred stock).  
In general, those differences are not parsed in this article, primarily for reasons of ease of 
illustration. 
3   The idiosyncrasies in the law of corporate finance examined in this article primarily involve 
matters of interpretation.  That is not to say only matters of contract interpretation receive 
idiosyncratic treatment in the law of contracts depending on the context.  For example, unique 
principles govern the application of consideration in the context of non-competition agreements.  
See, e.g., Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1980) (collecting 
authority reaching inconsistent conclusions concerning whether continued employment 
constitutes consideration supporting a non-compete agreement).  See generally 2 ARTHUR L. 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 6.19 (Joseph M. Perillo, ed., John E. Murray, Jr., supp.) 
(LEXIS through release 13S1, June 2013) (discussing alternative approaches); 6 RICHARD A. 
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 13:13 (Westlaw through July 2013) (discussing consideration 
in this context); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration for Employee’s Covenant Not 
to Compete, Entered into after Inception of Employment, 51 A.L.R.3d 825 (1973) (collecting authority). 
The law governing satisfaction of conditions provides a second illustration, where the 
pertinent principles appear to change markedly in different contexts.  Compare Moran v. Erk, 901 
N.E.2d 187 (N.Y. 2008) (discussing an attorney approval condition in a real estate contract; 
concluding that buyers are not required to purchase even though they prevented satisfaction of 
the condition by advising lawyer not to approve) with AquaSource, Inc. v. Wind Dance Farm, Inc., 
833 N.E.2d 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing a corporate obligation conditioned on approval 
by its board; concluding that the failure to present it to the board made obligation unconditional).  
But see S. Internet Sys., Inc. v. Pritula, 856 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the 
failure to present to the board was not a breach because there was no contract to which a duty of 
good faith could appertain). 
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inconsistencies in the application of contract doctrine depending on the subject 
matter.4  Principles applied to interpret corporate financing instruments are 
different from those typically applied modernly to interpret other agreements.  
Second, this article illustrates the inherent impracticability of achieving the goals 
justifying the use of different interpretive principles.  The putative rationale for 
applying different interpretive principles is to assure consistency and predictability 
in interpretation.  However, that goal is not achieved.  Different interpretive 
principles apply to different parts of corporate financing agreements, yielding an 
incoherent interpretative mosaic and ongoing uncertainty as to whether 
anomalous interpretive principles will continue to be applied in particular 
contexts.  Third, this article notes that the idiosyncratic interpretative principles 
applied to corporate financing instruments impede investors’ ability to diversify 
and increase the extent to which the law reaches erroneous interpretative 
conclusions. 
It is helpful to put this overview in context.  Consider two cases.  In, Reiss 
v. Financial Performance Corp.,5 the New York Court of Appeals held that the 
number of shares purchasable on exercise of warrants (stock purchase rights) 
outstanding prior to a reverse split—a transaction in which outstanding shares of 
stock are reclassified into a smaller number of shares with each shareholder 
retaining the same proportionate interest and, therefore, not materially influenced 
by the event—are not affected by the reverse split.  Of course, absent some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4   A basic dichotomy in the construction of these instruments is noted by Bratton.  See William 
W. Bratton, Jr., The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 
371 (1983).  Bratton articulates the dichotomy as between “the exacting view of contract 
interpretation of Williston and the first Restatement of Contracts (herein denoted ‘classical’) and 
the more relaxed view of Corbin and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (herein denoted 
‘neoclassical’)….”  Id. at 372-73.  Bratton concludes that “courts should stop vacillating and take a 
fully neoclassical approach to debt contract interpretation.”).  See also Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds 
Have More Fun?  A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate Bondholders Rights, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1 (offering additional observations on inconsistencies in the application of contract 
doctrine).  
The division in the authority appears to concern the extent literalism will bend to the 
evident purposes expressed in the writing by referencing the writing as a whole to determine the 
purposes of the provisions and give effect to those provisions.  Authority that would fully extend 
“neoclassical” interpretative approaches to corporate financing instruments, and the attendant jury 
determination of the meaning with full reference to objective manifestations of assent in 
agreements considered ambiguous under otherwise contemporary norms, seems infrequent. 
5   Reiss v. Fin. Performance Corp., 764 N.E.2d 958, 961 (N.Y. 2001). 
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adjustment, holders of options to purchase the stock would have their option 
values changed.  The court concluded no implied adjustment was warranted.6   
That interpretation substantially increases the value of the warrants.  
Common stock represents simply a proportionate interest in the residual value of 
the firm, with the relative as opposed to the actual number of shares being 
significant.7  An actual reason why parties would have bargained for this result is 
missing.8  The outcome, even if a better literal reading of the contract, disregards 
this basic nature of stock.9   
On the other hand, a second case involving a similar issue but not 
involving a dispute between an issuer and a securityholder, Cofman v. Acton Corp.,10 
reached the opposite result.  The case involved a settlement agreement, under 
which one party provided others various contractual rights similar to warrants.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the trial court’s 
determination that an adjustment should be made in the rights granted under the 
settlement agreement as a consequence of a reverse split, even though the 
agreement did not expressly provide for such an adjustment.  The court expressly 
stated interpretive principles applicable to corporate financing instruments should 
not be applied to a settlement agreement.11  This pair of cases expressly indicates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6   Id. at 959-60. 
7   This observation was made long ago.  See, e.g., VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 347, at 353 (1882) (“If then a corporation having power to increase 
its nominal or share capital has accumulated a surplus which it would be entitled to distribute 
among its shareholders, it may issue to the shareholders new paid-up shares, to the extent of the 
surplus on hand . . . .”).  The stockholders do not in reality gain thereby, but the number of their 
shares is increased in proportion as their value is diminished.  The relative rights and powers of 
the several stockholders thus remain unaltered. 
8   See generally infra note 290 (quoting Berle to the effect that “[i]t is believed” a court would make 
an equitable adjustment). 
9   Note the result of the type reached in Reiss is not constrained to avoiding implying terms 
benefiting an issuer whose actions trigger the problem.  Other cases apply similar literal 
interpretations where the adversely affected party is the securityholder.  See infra note 162. 
10   958 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1992). 
11   Id. at 497 n.5 (“We do not pause over Partnership’s sought analogy to convertible debentures, 
where the rule is that anti-dilution must be expressly stated.  These are formal, and complicated 
commercial structures, prepared with care for the general public.  Purchasers have the bonds in 
any event. Here we have a simple agreement between individuals, not even assignable.”) (citing 
Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 940-45 (5th Cir. 1981); Parkinson v. W. End St. Ry., 
53 N.E. 891 (Mass. 1899)). 
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that interpretative principles applied to corporate financing instruments are 
different from those customarily applied in contractual interpretation. 
Literal interpretation of corporate financing instruments traces back at 
least to Parkinson v. West End St. Ry. Co.,12 where the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, per Justice Holmes, also implemented a formal, literal 
interpretation of a corporate financing instrument, justifying the outcome “not 
because the law has not machinery for keeping such a right alive, but because, not 
being bound to do so, [the issuer] has made dispositions which manifestly take no 
account of it.”13  One may describe continued adherence to this interpretative 
approach as vestigial literalism.   
A modern approach to contract interpretation de-emphasizes literalism 
and gives great weight to the parties’ evident purposes.14  Illustrative in addition to 
Cofman is Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.,15 which involved a claim that an issuer of 
convertible debentures16 (meaning debentures that give a holder the right to have 
the debentures exchanged for common stock) failed to give adequate notice of a 
redemption.  The redemption terminated the conversion right.  Holders objected 
to the inadequate notice, because those failing to convert received cash worth 
about one-third of the value that they could have received on conversion.17  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not limit the promisee-
debentureholders rights to the express literal terms.  It found an implied duty to 
give reasonable notice and stated, as to the notice actually given, “While it may 
have conformed to the requirements of the Indenture it was simply insufficient to 
give fair and reasonable notice to the debenture holders.”18  
The primary justification for the vestigial literalism sometimes followed is 
an asserted enhanced desirability of consistency in the construction of corporate 
financing instruments, even at the expense of reaching the “correct” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12   53 N.E. 891 (Mass. 1899). 
13   Id. at at 892. 
14   See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1981) (“Words and other conduct 
are interpreted in the light of all circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is 
ascertainable it is given great weight.”). 
15   520 F.2d 1373, 1383 (2d Cir. 1975). 
16   Id. at 1374.   
17   Id. at 1374-75. 
18   Id. at 1383. 
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interpretation.19  However, for a number of reasons, predictability is not achieved, 
and is perhaps even suppressed.   
First, deference more often is given to outcomes in prior cases than to the 
principles that yielded those outcomes.  The interpretive principles applied to 
corporate financing instruments sometimes deemphasize the actual language 
used.  Some cases reflect a sequence in which a court first interprets a provision, 
relying on the precise language or the context to support the conclusion, and then 
another court, in another case, elides the basis for the initial decision and extends 
the interpretative outcome to a case where the significant context or particulars in 
language are not present.20 
Second, the modern outcome depends on whether the issue was first 
litigated long ago.  Over time, courts increasingly have emphasized seeking to give 
effect to the parties’ evident purposes,21 de-emphasizing a literalism that courts 
formerly followed to a greater extent.  When an issue was litigated long ago, the 
literalism of the nineteenth century governing its interpretation often will 
continue to be followed today.  However, where the issue was not litigated long 
ago, a court may apply modern interpretative principles, emphasizing 
implementation of the evident purposes, as in Van Gemert.  The result is a mosaic 
of modern corporate finance jurisprudence that is path-dependent based on 
whether a particular issue happens to have been litigated long ago. 22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19   See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
20   See infra Part IV.B. 
21   Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1981). 
22   For example, In re Hennepin County 1986 Recycling Bond Litigation, 540 N.W.2d 494, 501-03 
(Minn. 1995), held that securityholders adequately alleged a breach of contract and the implied 
covenant of good faith against an issuer that sought to trigger a redemption, on terms not 
otherwise permitted under the instruments, by arranging a default.  This is a purpose-centric 
interpretation.  See id. at 500-01 (“Logically, one must ask why the parties would have painstakingly 
negotiated an economic risk allocation in the bond agreements, permitting the County to redeem 
at its option prior to the October 1, 2000, maturity if it were willing to pay a premium to do so, 
but simultaneously permitting the County to redeem at the expiration of the Letter of Credit, 
without a premium penalty, simply by blocking renewal or extension of the Letter of Credit.”).  
The case inhibits a promisee’s terminating duties by an intentional default, extending old authority 
holding an acceleration provision in a note that by its terms provides for an automatic acceleration 
upon a default simply creates an option to accelerate.  See, e.g., Richardson v. Warner, 28 F. 343, 
344 (D. Neb. 1886) (“A provision in a mortgage that, upon default in the payment of interest due 
on any of the notes secured thereby, the entire debt shall immediately become due and payable, 
does not, of itself, cause the notes to mature, so as to start the running of the statute of 
limitations. The stipulation is permissive only, and simply gives a privilege to the mortgagee.”); In 
re Premier Entm’t Biloxi LLC, 445 B.R. 582, 627-28 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2010) (referencing 
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Third, deference is not consistently applied.  For example, the 
intermediate appellate court in Reiss implemented modern interpretative 
principles, but on appeal, the New York Court of Appeals rejected that 
approach.23  A second example is provided by a number of modern cases 
discussed below that do not defer to prior authority construing the import of 
indenture covenants addressing distribution of SEC filings to bondholders.24 
Fourth, a more subtle point illustrates that the result of this anomalous 
interpretive approach creates a type of uncertainty not fully addressed by the 
authority.  Certainty at the time litigation is commenced may be at the expense of 
certainty as of the time an agreement is drafted.  It is not clear why the former 
should be promoted at the expense of the latter. 
To illustrate this distinction, it may be noted that one supposes when it 
becomes clear litigation may ensue concerning interpretation of a corporate 
financing instrument in a particular context, the lawyers responsible for litigating 
the matter can undertake an extensive search for authority addressing the matter.  
However, at least in this author’s experience negotiating these kinds of corporate 
financing instruments, during the negotiation the participants do not extensively 
research how courts have construed all possible ways in which particular terms 
could be written.  Rather, those negotiating these instruments become aware of 
certain interpretations of particular provisions, in the course of their professional 
reading, and proceed in drafting based on extrapolating from principles evidenced 
by authority with which they are familiar.  The intermittent application of vestigial 
interpretive principles produces a mosaic of law that is not predictable to 
draftsmen from knowledge of only selected interpretations.  Because the 
application of vestigial interpretive principles is path-dependent based on whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
common law rule that acceleration clauses are not self-operative, arising from authority not 
involving securities issued under an indenture, but stating the principle can be altered by contract); 
K. A. Dreschler, Annotation, Acceleration of Note or Mortgage as Automatic or Optional, 159 A.L.R. 
1077 (collecting authority). 
23   Reiss v. Fin. Performance Corp., 279 A.D.2d 13, 19, 715 N.Y.S.2d 29 (2000) (“[P]laintiffs and 
the dissent assert that a literalistic approach to the interpretation of the warrants is compelled as a 
matter of law. We cannot agree. Surely a court is not required to disregard common sense and 
slavishly bow to the written word where to do so would plainly ignore the true intentions of the 
parties in the making of a contract.  Such formalistic literalism serves no function but to 
contravene the essence of proper contract interpretation, which, of course, is to enforce a contract 
in accordance with the true expectations of the parties in light of the circumstances existing at the 
time of the formation of the contract.” (citations omitted)), aff’d as modified, 764 N.E.2d 958 (N.Y. 
2001). 
24   See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
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a particular issue was litigated long ago, and that path-dependence is not 
predictable, there is an offsetting decrease in predictability to individuals 
negotiating these instruments. 
Predictability is not the sole goal of contract interpretation.  This failing 
attempt to assure predictability also impedes the realization of diversification—
one of the benefits desired by those who enter into these contracts.  Investors 
often will purchase a portfolio of securities in order to decrease the volatility of 
the aggregate value of their investments.  However, this uniformity of 
interpretation produces the opposite result.  If unusual deference is paid to the 
outcome reached in the first case to interpret a particular matter, a risk is created 
that is more difficult to mitigate through diversification because, by premise, the 
same result will govern other investments.   
Moreover, the excessive deference is more likely to result in an average 
answer that is “wrong” or does not conform to ex ante expectations.  That is 
because common law courts normally engage in iterative decision making.  
Subsequent decisions in other jurisdictions can correct mistakes.  A wise initial 
decision is more likely to be followed than a poor one.  Thus, the results reached 
in subsequent decisions are more likely to be correct than those initially reached.  
So a change in the development of common law doctrine under which enhanced 
deference is paid to initial decisions, even if not considered subsequently 
“correct” as an initial proposition, generally produces more incorrect outcomes.  
This change decreases the ability to diversify, and generally creates worse 
outcomes. 
Part II of this article summarizes the reasons that courts have sought to 
use alternative interpretative principles in construing corporate financing 
instruments.  Courts have concluded there is a heightened need for predictability 
and consistency in the interpretation of these instruments, which has had the 
effect of partially suppressing the development of contract doctrine as applied to 
interpretation of these instruments.  The interpretative principles also appear to 
be influenced by the fact that the contracts implicate the rights of multiple parties, 
some of whom are not present at the time the contracts are negotiated.  
Additionally, interpretation of parallel language in statutory provisions that govern 
the transactions may influence interpretation of the contractual provisions.  
Multiple factors thus give rise to anomalies in the interpretation of these 
instruments. 
Part III of this article details these anomalies.  Subpart A first illustrates 
some circumstances where conventional principles are applied to interpret 
corporate financing instruments.  Subpart B then identifies select individual issues 
that have given rise to inconsistent interpretative approaches.  Subpart C collects 
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authority emphasizing interpretative principles that modernly have been discarded 
in other contexts.  The complexity of these instruments may result in courts being 
unable to identify the evident purposes.  Subpart D then collects authority where 
courts apparently retreat into tedious literalism because the evident purposes are 
difficult to grasp. 
Part IV of this article addresses two additional anomalies.  Subpart A 
examines the inconsistent application of contra proferentem.  Subpart B then 
provides authority that curiously treats some provisions in corporate financing 
instruments as abstract concepts that are to be construed as divorced from the 
language actually used.  Some concluding remarks then follow in Part V. 
II. REASONS AND RATIONALE UNDERLYING INTERPRETATIVE 
PRINCIPLES AND IDIOSYNCRASIES 
At least five categories of circumstances give rise to idiosyncrasies in the 
interpretation of corporate financing instruments: 
1. There is an increased need for predictability and consistency, courts 
have concluded, in the interpretation of these instruments; 
2. The rights of multiple parties, some of whom are not present when 
the instruments are negotiated and others who owe varying levels of 
duties to the individuals identified only later; 
3. The agreements are interpreted in the shadow of statutory language 
regulating some of the covered transactions, including corporation 
law as well as components of the federal securities laws (including the 
Trust Indenture Act of 1939);25 and, in addition, other statutory 
language and concepts are reflected in the agreements, allowing for 
interpretation of statutory provisions to infiltrate interpretation of 
these agreements; 
4. The large dollar amounts of the transactions, coupled with their 
sophistication in structure and frequency, results in lengthy 
documents addressing the transactions in extensive detail, 
memorializing understandings the purposes of which may be 
relatively less patent; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25   Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (Westlaw through  P.L. 113-13 
approved June 3, 2013). 
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5. The process of documenting these agreements results in 
contemporaneous descriptions not often available for interpreting 
other contractual agreements. 
This Part details those categories and the underlying rationales. 
A. Heightened Need for Predictability and Consistency in Interpretation 
Because corporate financing instruments often are designed to create 
rights intended to be traded, courts have concluded that certainty in interpretation 
of these instruments is of enhanced importance.  Two of the prominent modern 
cases articulating this rationale are Broad v. Rockwell International Corp.26 and Sharon 
Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank.27   In Broad, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit articulated the view and identified why the rationale applies to 
corporate financing instruments: 
A large degree of uniformity in the language of debenture 
indentures is essential to the effective functioning of the financial 
markets: uniformity of the indentures that govern competing 
debenture issues is what makes it possible meaningfully to 
compare one debenture issue with another, focusing only on the 
business provisions of the issue (such as the interest rate, the 
maturity date, the redemption and sinking fund provisions and the 
conversion rate) and the economic conditions of the issuer, 
without being misled by peculiarities in the underlying 
instruments.28 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Sharon Steel echoed this 
rationale, stating: 
Whereas participants in the capital market can adjust their affairs 
according to a uniform interpretation, whether it be correct or not 
as an initial proposition, the creation of enduring uncertainties as 
to the meaning of boilerplate provisions would decrease the value 
of all debenture issues and greatly impair the efficient working of 
capital markets.  Such uncertainties would vastly increase the risks 
and, therefore, the costs of borrowing with no offsetting benefits 
either in the capital market or in the administration of justice.  Just 
such uncertainties would be created if interpretation of boilerplate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26   642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981). 
27   691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982). 
28   Rockwell, 642 F.2d at 943. 
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provisions were submitted to juries sitting in every judicial district 
in the nation.29 
These cases are widely cited,30 and have been the subject of recent 
commentary.31  Although the discussion in Sharon Steel appears to be limited to 
standard provisions that are “found in virtually all indentures,”32 this approach has 
been referenced by some courts as to provisions that are not found in virtually all 
indentures.33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29   Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d at 1048.  Accord Rievman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 618 F. Supp. 592, 
601 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“In addition, at least one of the key cases relied on by plaintiffs cannot be 
effectively distinguished by the Railroad, and appears to govern this case . . . .  The New York 
Court of Appeals seemed to be laying down a per se rule: because of the ‘vast sums invested in 
railroad bonds’ and the need to insure investor confidence, railroad mortgage trustees may not 
‘sell, change, or in any manner compromise the security except as authorized in express terms or 
by necessary implication’—even where the sale or change would not harm the bondholders’ 
interests.”); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 29 A.3d 225, 241 (Del. 2011) 
(“Courts endeavor to apply the plain terms of such provisions in a uniform manner to promote 
market stability.”).  Authority identifying the preference for consistency in interpretation of 
standardized instruments is not, however, limited to interpretation of securities.  See, e.g., Mass. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, No. 4791-VC, 2010 WL 
2929552, at *5 n.1 (Del. Ch. June 23, 2010) (stating, in referencing the principle in connection 
with a fidelity bond, “The point applies equally to other standardized instruments.”).  So, the law 
governing interpretation of corporate financing instruments is unusual but not unique. 
30   See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (quoting both); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1520 n.26 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting both); Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. 
Supp. 1529, 1539 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing both); Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 
392, 398 (Del. 1996) (quoting Sharon Steel and citing Broad in discussing anti-destruction provisions 
the court describes as “hopelessly ambiguous”); Concord Real Estate CDO 2006-1, Ltd. v. Bank 
of Am., 996 A.2d 324, 331 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing Sharon Steel) (cancelation of securities). 
This rationale—the need for certainty—also may be the basis for a determination that 
there is not an implied limit on the exercise of an express right.  See Rievman, 618 F. Supp. at 601, 
(referencing the “‘vast sums invested in railroad bonds’ and the need to insure investor 
confidence” in rejecting an implied right to alter collateral benefitting over-secured bondholders.)  
See infra notes 172-177 and accompanying text. 
31   Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance Jurisprudence, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 1461. 
32   Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d  at 1048. 
33   See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1539 (protection against re-financing with 
lower-interest-rate debt); Kaiser Aluminum, 681 A.2d at 398 (quoting Sharon Steel in discussing anti-
destruction provisions that vary significantly among indentures; discussing provisions the court 
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There are two separate components to the predictability and certainty 
promoted by this authority; they are, in fact, in some tension with each other.  
The Fifth Circuit in Broad identified a desire to promote fungibility as to certain 
components of corporate financing instruments.  The language from Sharon Steel 
identified a preference for predictability in interpretation.  Both components 
attempt to implement a preference for facilitating, and decreasing the transaction 
costs of, raising capital, by attempting to decrease the need to engage in valuation 
activities that can be costly. 
1. Fungibility   
There are costs associated with assigning dollar values to various terms in 
corporate financing instruments.  If all issuers have the same terms as to a 
particular issue, the valuation is less difficult and, hence, less costly.34 
For example, consider “successor obligor” provisions in corporate bonds.  
Such provisions may allow, without bondholder consent, sale of all or 
substantially all of an issuer’s assets where the buyer assumes the initial obligor’s 
obligations.  An issue may arise concerning how multiple asset sales by the initial 
obligor will be treated under such a covenant.  Are they all integrated in some 
way? 
The possibility that an issuer of bonds will sell its assets to someone else is 
present for most, perhaps essentially all, non-governmental issuers of bonds.  If 
contracts limiting these actions without bondholder consent have significantly 
different terms, an investor choosing between prospective bond purchases may 
need to reduce the impact of the variation to a dollar value.  That may require 
assessment of the relative likelihood that various prospective issuers would 
engage in transactions that might trigger the need for protection.  On the other 
hand, if the terms are uniform and provide adequate protection, a prospective 
investor may elide assessment of the differences in probabilities that the various 
issuers may sell their assets. 
The point is that prospective investors are choosing among investments 
in various issuers.  The choice is simplified if certain terms (non-financial terms) 
are standardized, because this limits the number of dimensions on which one 
should compare the various investments, and, therefore, simplifies the analysis.  A 
more complex analysis also creates greater uncertainty, which also increases the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
describes as “hopelessly ambiguous”).  The language of Broad, 642 F.2d at 943, quoted supra text 
accompanying note 28, seems to be to a similar effect. 
34   See generally Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective 
Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1079 (2002) (discussing “innovation externalities”). 
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cost of capital.  Increased complexity of analysis creates risk of error and also 
introduces variables that cannot be precisely quantified.  Increased uncertainty 
increases the likelihood that a successful investor will pay more because it has 
made mistakes that others have not, over-valuing the investment—a winner’s 
curse.  This ultimately results in decreased willingness to invest. 
However, fungibility cannot be achieved.  The drafting of these complex 
instruments is an iterative process.  As issues arise in one deal, draftsmen seek to 
include in future transactions language addressing the matter, which may but need 
not provide for the treatment courts apply in litigation.  The process of fixing 
problems made in prior generations of transactions necessarily results in a lack of 
fungibility.  The goal of fungibility conflicts with the natural process of learning 
from the mistakes of others in drafting these complex instruments and fixing the 
problems. 
2. Consistency and Predictability  
The increased emphasis on certainty includes a desire for enhanced 
consistency—interpreting some particular language the same way in all disputes.  
Evidently, it is intended that, once language is interpreted all market participants, 
not just those involved in the first case to litigate the issue, are expected simply to 
move on, adjust their affairs in light of that interpretation, and pretermit litigation 
of the same issue by different parties in a different forum.  The Sharon Steel court 
indicated that “participants . . . can adjust their affairs according to a uniform 
interpretation . . . .”35  Clearly, this was envisioned to avoid costs of subsequent 
litigation by different parties and allow planning in the context of certainty. 
As this article will discuss, that predictability is not achieved, and those 
costs are not saved.  Matters are re-litigated by other parties, sometimes 
successfully, meaning that certainty for planning is not realized.  For example, a 
series of cases in the last decade involved whether an issuer’s failure to make 
timely SEC filings and deliver copies to a trustee constituted a breach under an 
indenture.  In an early case, Bank of New York v. BearingPoint, Inc.,36 the New York 
Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the trustee on a claim that failure 
to deliver the filings breached the indenture.37  However, a number of cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35   Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d at 1048; see supra text accompanying note 29.  But see Kahan, supra note 
34, at 1082 (arguing in favor of a change in a particular modern interpretation in light of claim 
outcome is unsatisfactory). 
36   No. 600169/06, 2006 WL 2670143 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 2006). 
37   Id. at *9. 
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decided after BearingPoint declined to defer to the prior construction and reached 
the opposite conclusion in construing similar language.38  The outcomes in the 
latter cases reflect a somewhat strong failure to defer to prior authority, because 
the BearingPoint decision was of a New York court, and the subsequent decisions 
were from courts in other locations construing New York law.39 
Another part of this rationale is a desire for enhanced predictability—
creating an environment in which one considering the application of particular 
language in an executed contract, or language proposed to be included in a 
contract being negotiated, can have increased confidence that the language will be 
interpreted in a particular fashion. 
The preference for predictability sometimes results in courts increasingly 
relying on literalism in interpreting these instruments.  Some argue a literal 
interpretation is more predictable and, thus, enhances predictability.40  In addition, 
the increased emphasis on literalism in part results from the fact that reference to 
older precedent is to authority decided when courts emphasized literalism of the 
type illustrated by Parkinson v. West End St. Ry. Co.41   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38   See, e.g., Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 565 F.3d 924, 928, 931 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (indenture governed by New York law); UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. v. Wilmington Trust 
Co., 548 F.3d 1124 (8th Cir. 2008); Cyberonics, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. H-07-
121, 2007 WL 1729977 (June 13, 2007). 
39   Affiliated Computer Services, 565 F.3d at 928 (indenture governed by New York law); 
UnitedHealth, 548 F.3d at 1128; Cyberonics, 2007 WL 1729977, at *3, 5 (“Although it decides a 
similar issue, Bearingpoint is an unpublished decision from a state trial court and is not binding on 
this Court.  The case was initially appealed but then withdrawn; therefore, no New York appellate 
court reviewed that decision.  Despite the Bearingpoint decision, the Court is not persuaded that the 
agreement between Cyberonics and Wells Fargo imposed any obligation upon Cyberonics other 
than to provide Wells Fargo with copies of documents and reports after those documents and 
reports had been filed with the SEC.  As required by New York law, this Court will enforce the 
agreement as it is written.”). 
40   See Bratton, supra note 4, at 401 (“A three-pronged argument support’s Broad’s proposition that 
classically inspired rules promote certainty.  First, classical rules restrict the scope of the 
interpretation inquiry.  This limits the range of interpretations to which a given contract is legally 
susceptible  . . . .”); Dick, supra note 31, at 1480-81 (stating, in reference to what that author 
identifies as a Certainty Imperative, “Consequently, a court adhering to the Imperative adopts a 
presumption that law reform or expansive analysis of any sort will impair market efficiency.  
Under this perspective, judicial decision-making in the financial realm poses a potentially 
dangerous externality.  Thus, judicial decisions are narrowly tailored to strict construction and 
passive enforcement of contracts.”). 
41   53 N.E. 891 (Mass. 1899).  See infra notes 281-286 and accompanying text (discussing the case). 
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As discussed below,42 it is not clear that the adopted adjustments to 
interpretive principles in fact enhance certainty in interpretation of corporate 
financing instruments.  The interpretation of an agreement involves balancing a 
literal reading with a reading reflecting the purposes evident from the language as 
a whole.  Uncertainty arises from the need for a dividing line.  Understanding that 
there has to be a dividing line—even older authority rejects complete 
literalism43—predictability is not enhanced by merely moving the imprecise 
dividing line.44   
3. Impediment to diversification  
It also bears mention that an approach involving enhanced deference to 
initial authority in fact can increase the cost of capital.  Investors purchase a 
portfolio of securities for purposes of diversification (which decreases the risk of 
the portfolio as a whole) because that decreased risk is valuable. 45  Enhanced 
deference to initial authority increases the risk. 
In diminishing the importance of whether an initial interpretation is 
“correct or not as an initial proposition,” a court is decreasing the relevance of 
whether the outcome of the litigation respects the bargain that the parties 
understood they struck or the purposes the parties had in mind when they 
reached the deal.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42   See infra Part III. 
43   See, e.g., supra note 22 (acceleration provisions not construed literally, based on longstanding 
authority); Bratton, supra note 4, at 403 (“Judges circumvented the strictures of the rules even in 
classicism’s palmy days.”). 
44   As a theoretical matter, there may be circumstances in the law where the location of where one 
draws a line may in fact enhance certainty.  Suppose that, at least some time before global 
positioning systems and sophisticated surveying, there may have been fewer disputes as to 
whether houses were on one person’s property where boundaries were drawn on the basis of a 
center of a waterway.  Understanding that residences are not typically in water, it is possible that in 
some circumstances, uncertainty as to the precise boundary may have less impact because there 
are fewer disputes that arise because the boundaries have been located in this particular way.  That 
kind of argument is not the extant claimed basis for increased certainty in interpretation of 
corporate financing instruments.   
45   Following the summer submission of the manuscript for this article, Professor Kelli Alces 
published an essay generally examining the diversification of legal consequences. Kelli A. Alces, 
Legal Diversification, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1977 (2013). But for this observation, the textual 
discussion in this article speaks as of summer 2013. 
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Some courts first hearing a matter will give effect to the intended bargain.  
Others will not properly identify what was sought to be achieved46 and will err.  If 
the matter is capable of being re-litigated with another issuer in a different forum, 
that allows for diversification of investment risk.  On the other hand, if all courts 
defer to the first to address the matter, that inhibits investment diversification. 
In addition, one hopes that successive attempts by courts to interpret an 
issue will result in better subsequent decision making.  Normal judicial decision 
making is not simply successive coin-flipping.  Rather, one would expect it would 
settle over time on better answers—that initial decisions based on thoughtful 
insights would be respected.  However, if a second look by a different court 
(perhaps one more experienced in the particular field) justifies its results in a more 
persuasive way, subsequent courts would be persuaded by the rationale of the 
latter, superior decision when faced with competing precedent.47  So, enhanced 
deference to precedent not only prevents diversification but also settles on an 
outcome that is less likely to be correct than the “average” outcome that would 
arise without this enhanced deference. 
B. Multiple Parties 
1.   Increased complexity and interpretative principles incorporating 
parties’ roles  
A typical corporate financing transaction involves multiple parties, only 
some of whom are present at the time the documents are negotiated and 
finalized.  Common to all these transactions would be the issuer and the investors 
(or prospective investors).  The initial investors often will not actually be present, 
or formally represented, in the negotiation of the instruments.  Rather, the terms 
of the instruments are negotiated between representatives for the issuer and one 
or more investment banks that are to assist in the sale of the securities to 
investors, either as an underwriter or as a placement agent.  If the securities are 
debt securities to be sold publicly, a bank acting as trustee will also be present. 
This multiplicity of parties and roles has a number of implications.  The 
trustee, if one is appointed, ultimately will assume conditional fiduciary duties to 
investors and will have certain rights, some of which are exclusive and others of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46   Cf. Bratton, supra note 4, at 405 (“Neoclassical analysis, by expanding the inquiry to include all 
real world expectations, requires courts to make judgments informed as much by business as by 
legal considerations.  Such business judgments lie outside of what many judges like to see as the 
ordinary sphere of their competence.”). 
47   See generally George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Legal Rules, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (discussing the tendency of the common law toward efficiency). 
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which are not, to pursue remedies against the issuer in the case of default.  This 
increases the complexity of the documents because the scope of the trustee’s 
obligations needs to be detailed, and the trustee’s exercise of remedies and the 
exercise of remedies by investors need to be coordinated by the documents. 
The parties ultimately benefiting from promises made by issuers in 
corporate financing transactions often are not present when the agreements are 
negotiated.  Most obviously, corporate financing instruments are designed to 
create contractual relationships that can be conveyed, and an active market in 
them often develops, either on a securities exchange or otherwise.  By definition, 
those acquiring the interests through subsequent trading will not have been 
present.  In addition, even the initial investors often are not present, depending 
on the nature of the transaction.  Rather, it is often the case in public offerings of 
securities that the participants in the negotiations are the issuer; one or more 
investment banks; if the securities are public debt, a trustee; and, of course, 
counsel.  The investment banks do not exclusively promote the interests of the 
future investors, because the issuer is also their client.  This collection of 
relationships influences the extent to which some courts apply interpretative 
principles that incorporate the roles of the parties,48 such as contra proferentem.49 
 
2.   Abstraction of negotiation; disregard of certain evidence   
Corporate financing transactions often produce certain extrinsic 
manifestations of intent that are not generally the product of contract negotiation.  
The contractual provisions often will be summarized in a prospectus, offering 
memorandum, or offering circular.  As to the description of the securities, careful 
practitioners may intentionally provide no insight by simply reproducing in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48   See generally Bratton, supra note 4, at 377 (concluding, “We have seen that the most basic of 
rubrics—interpretation in accordance with the intention of the parties—cannot be applied literally 
in the interpretation of trust indentures.”). 
49   See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 398 (Del. 1996) (“Courts have 
disagreed, however, whether the principle should apply in the case of detailed indentures or 
similar documents.  This reflects, in part, contrasting views regarding the respective roles played 
by underwriters and issuers.  See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, Del.Ch., 542 A.2d 785, 791 (1987), aff’d, 
Del.Supr., 549 A.2d 300 (1988) (‘Underwriters of convertible securities do have an interest in 
negotiating protection on points regarded as material by ultimate purchasers of those securities.’); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., S.D.N.Y., 716 F.Supp. 1504, 1509 (1989) (‘Since the 
underwriters must then sell or place the bonds, they necessarily negotiate in part with the interests 
of the buyers in mind.’).” (footnote omitted)).  See also infra note 232 and accompanying text. 
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offering documents selections from the underlying contractual relationships,50 
precisely in order to avoid expressing an opinion concerning what the instruments 
mean.  However, even if those documents are not illuminating as to an issue that 
becomes disputed, other contemporaneous documents may capture the parties’ 
intent, such as internal communications between various investment banks that 
are participating in marketing the securities51 or communications with rating 
agencies.52  Because these transactions are large, they may capture media attention 
that results in public communications relevant to construing the contractual 
terms.  This collection of sources creates idiosyncratic issues of contract 
interpretation. 
Objective manifestations of intent made during contract negotiation 
generally may be considered in interpreting ambiguous contracts.53  However, it is 
more problematic to reference those objective manifestations of intent in 
interpreting corporate financing agreements, where the persons on one side of the 
bargain are not present during the negotiations and not directly represented.  That 
would support judicial reluctance to reference some extrinsic manifestations of 
intent in interpreting corporate financing instruments. 
In sum, because these contractual rights are designed to be traded, courts 
seek to enhance the certainty of contractual interpretation.  In addition, this 
context has fostered a decreased reference to extrinsic manifestations of intent, 
even though these transactions produce some evidence of this that is not typically 
available in other contracts.  
C. Statutory Overlay 
Interpretation of these corporate financing instruments is also influenced 
by separate statutory provisions.  The Trust Indenture Act of 193954 directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50   See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 103, Direct Testimony of Stephen L. Burns, Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. 
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. at 14, ¶ 26, 13 Civ. 1582 (PAE), 2013 WL 1890278 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
21, 2013) (“Associates who work for me are under standing instructions in such situations to 
conform, closely if not exactly, the draft indenture to the applicable provision in the description of 
notes of the prospectus supplement.”). 
51   See Direct Testimony Declaration of James A. Mullin, Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of 
N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. at p.5, ¶¶ 12-14; p.9, ¶ 26, p. 11, ¶ 30, 13 Civ. 1582 (PAE), 2013 WL 
1890278 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2013) (referencing internal memorandum in providing an opinion as 
to the terms of securities). 
52   See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
53   See, e.g., JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 3.10 (6th ed. 2009). 
54   Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (Westlaw through  P.L. 113-13 
approved June 3, 2013). 
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regulates the terms of some of these agreements.  Under that act, publicly sold 
debt securities are generally required to be issued under an indenture appointing a 
trustee.55  The act provides that certain terms are automatically incorporated by 
reference into the indenture, some of which can be changed by agreement.56  
Thus, interpretation of these provisions inherently involves statutory 
interpretation.57 
Statutory provisions can have a more indirect impact on the contours of 
the rights created by corporate financing instruments.  An issuer may structure a 
transaction of potential concern to securityholders in a form that is regulated by 
state corporation law.  For example, an issuer having outstanding convertible 
stock may have promised to make adjustments in the convertible stock if the 
underlying securities are reclassified.  An issuer may alter the underlying stock in a 
merger, giving rise to interpretive questions concerning whether promises 
triggered by reclassifications of underlying stock are implicated by a merger.  
Delaware and some other jurisdictions follow the Doctrine of 
Independent Legal Significance,58 under which “action taken in accordance with 
different sections of that law are acts of independent legal significance even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55   15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(a)(1) (Westlaw through  P.L. 113-13 approved June 3, 2013). 
56   See 15 U.S.C. § 77kkk (Westlaw through  P.L. 113-13 approved June 3, 2013) (concerning 
trustee conflicts); 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(d) (Westlaw through  P.L. 113-13 approved June 3, 2013) 
(requiring a certificate of fair market value); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ooo(a) (Westlaw through  P.L. 113-13 
approved June 3, 2013) (discussing trustee duties prior to default); 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(b) (Westlaw 
through  P.L. 113-13 approved June 3, 2013) (allowing trustee to withhold certain notices of 
default); 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d) (2013) (addressing certain trustee duties); 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(e) 
(addressing undertakings concerning costs); 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a)(1) (Westlaw through  P.L. 113-
13 approved June 3, 2013) (discussing no-action provision); 15 U.S.C. § 77rrr(c) (Westlaw through  
P.L. 113-13 approved June 3, 2013) (describing the effect of prescribed indenture provisions). 
57   See generally Emmet & Co. v. Catholic Health E., 951 N.Y.S.2d 846, 850-51 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 
(involving claims alleging issuer’s tender offer for bonds to be followed by redemption of bonds 
not tendered constituted a partial redemption not following partial redemption procedures; 
exception in no-action provision to payments of principal and interest does not apply because the 
exception is limited to past-due principal and interest). 
58   Statutory provisions include GA. CODE ANN., § 14-2-103 (Westlaw through June 15, 2013); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.1-430 (Westlaw through 2012 First Extraordinary Sess.); MO. REV 
STAT. § 351.017 (Westlaw through May 15, 2013).  See also William J. Carney & George B. 
Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13-14, 13 n.70 
(also citing case law in the State of Kansas and the State of Rhode Island using the signal “See, 
e.g.,” although there does not appear to be significant supporting case law in other jurisdictions.  
See  Westlaw search: “independent legal significance” /200 corporation, all state and federal cases 
(identifying 126 cases providing limited additional authority on-point) (July 1, 2013). 
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though the end result may be the same under different sections.”59  This principle 
of statutory interpretation has been extended to construction of corporate 
financing contracts in Delaware.60  In a variety of contexts, this principle has been 
the basis for allowing an issuer to avoid prohibitions or limitations on certain 
transactions by achieving the same result through another extraordinary action.  
For example, voting rights applicable to adverse amendments in terms of 
securities may be avoided by achieving the same result through a transaction 
structured as a merger.61 
As another illustration of inconsistency, although Delaware courts 
frequently apply the principle (although not always),62 there is older U.S. Supreme 
Court authority taking the opposite approach—treating an action as permitted 
because a similar result could have been achieved in a different way that was not 
prohibited.63 
Other statutes regulate various types of corporate transactions, such as tax 
law.  Interpretive principles developed to restrain avoidance of statutory 
restrictions, such as those applied in tax law, may be carried over to fortify 
interpretation of corporate financing instruments.  The analogy is easier because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59   Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 377 (Del. 1963). 
60   See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture 
Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 837 (2004) (“In a modern twist, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has changed the doctrine of independent legal significance from a rule of statutory 
interpretation into a rule of contract interpretation.”); C. Stephen Bigler & Blake Rohrbacher, 
Form or Substance? The Past, Present, and Future of the Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance, 63 BUS. 
LAW. 1 (2007) (discussing the doctrine and how recent court decisions may impact the doctrine). 
61   See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 853, 855 (Del. 1998) (holding 
based on the certificate of designation that holders of preferred stock had a right to a class vote on 
a merger of the issuer into its newly-formed subsidiary in which the preferred stock would be 
converted into common stock of the survivor; noting voting rights under section 242 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law were not implicated because the transaction was a merger). 
62   See La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1191-92 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(special dividend treated as merger consideration triggering appraisal rights). 
63   Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1945) (“Enforcement of an overriding public policy 
should not have its effect visited on one class with a corresponding windfall to another class of 
security holders.  Nor should common stock values be made to depend on whether the 
Commission, in enforcing compliance with the Act, resorts to dissolution of a particular company 
in the holding company system, or resorts instead to the devices of merger or consolidation, 
which would not run afoul of a charter provision formulated years before adoption of the Act in 
question.  The Commission in its enforcement of the policies of the Act should not be hampered 
in its determination of the proper type of holding company structure by considerations of 
avoidance of harsh effects on various stock interests which might result from enforcement of 
charter provisions of doubtful applicability to the procedures undertaken.”). 
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the same kinds of moves available to corporations to avoid proscriptions in tax or 
other statutory law may be used to evade promises in corporate financing 
instruments.  For example, reference to a “step transaction” or a “sham,” 
interpretive principles familiar in tax law,64 may be applied analogously in 
interpreting corporate financing instruments.  In corporation law, the common 
corporate principle concerning respect to the corporate form, or disregarding it 
under principles of piercing the corporate veil, have analogues in interpretation of 
corporate financing instruments where issuers have sought with some success to 
avoid proscriptions by acting through subsidiaries.65 
Additionally, a number of statutory provisions may reference terms or 
acts regulated by contract.  State corporation law will, for example, regulate 
declarations of dividends.  Of course, covenants in a corporate financing 
instrument also may reference dividends by restricting them.  Interpretive gloss 
applied in construing the term in the statutory context may carry over to 
interpretation of the term as used in corporate financing agreements.   
In sum, statutory provisions directly adjust the interpretation of corporate 
financing instruments.  In addition, interpretive principles governing statutory 
language, which may be at odds with how corporate financing instruments 
otherwise would be interpreted, may be imported into interpretation of corporate 
financing instruments in derogation of the norm of literalism. 
D. Nature of the Transactions; Creation of Potentially Relevant Evidence of Intent 
The dollar amounts at issue in these transactions are large.  The 
transactions also create relationships that can last decades, sometimes occasionally 
longer.66  Consequently, the documents governing these relationships are lengthy, 
detailed and complex.  That complexity results in more interpretive issues being 
raised.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64   See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BYRNES & JASON A. FISKE, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION § 26:11 (Westlaw through July 2013) (providing section titled, “Sham Transactions and 
Transactions Lacking Economic Substance”); JAMES S. EUSTICE & THOMAS BRANTLEY,  
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 1.05[2][d] (Westlaw 
through 2013) (“In viewing a dynamic whole, the courts often say that an integrated transaction 
must not be broken into independent steps or conversely that the separate steps must be taken 
together in attaching tax consequences. The so-called step transaction doctrine is encountered 
most often in the taxation of corporations and shareholders, but its scope is much broader.”). 
65   See infra notes 143-150 and accompanying text. 
66   See, e.g., Rievman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 618 F. Supp. 592, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (involving 
100-year and 150-year bonds). 
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Modernly, reference often is made to the parties’ evident purposes in 
contract interpretation.67  The complexity of the transactions may make the 
purposes less patent.  It appears that, when the evident purposes cannot be 
ascertained, a court interpreting a contract is more likely to retreat into reliance on 
literalism and obscure rules of syntax.  Thus, that kind of retreat is more likely in 
construction of these instruments. 
A large dollar amount also provides a greater incentive to try to evade 
these contractual promises.  In a transaction involving small dollar amounts, 
transaction costs may make it infeasible for a promisor to engage in complicated 
transactions designed to evade contractual promises.  However, where the dollar 
amount is large, as in corporate financing contracts, the transaction costs may be 
relatively small, in comparison to the benefits to be realized.  Hence, the large 
dollar amount can increase the likelihood that creative actions to evade 
contractual promises are proposed and ultimately litigated. 
As discussed above,68 the process of consummating these transactions 
often involves the creation of documents, such as prospectuses or offering 
memoranda, that describe the negotiated contracts.  There also may be press 
releases as well as documents prepared by investment banks for internal 
distribution that describe the terms of the transaction so that investment bank 
personnel can prepare for marketing efforts or communications with ratings 
agencies.69  This atypical creation of documents memorializing 
contemporaneously the understanding of the instruments, only some of which are 
available to the ultimate parties to the instruments, presents issues as to the scope 
of material to be considered in interpreting the instruments.  As will be seen, a 
number of cases seem to evince an idiosyncratic bias against reference to this type 
of extrinsic evidence in subsequent litigation.70 
 
III. CONSISTENCY AND DEVIATION FROM NORMS IN INTERPRETATIVE 
APPROACHES TO CONSTRUCTION OF CORPORATE FINANCING 
INSTRUMENTS 
One can identify competing paradigms of contract interpretation that 
emphasize the language used:  one that emphasizes literalism and another that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67   See, e.g., infra 80 and accompanying text. 
68   See supra note 50-51 and accompanying text. 
69   See In re Tribune Co., 472 B.R. 223, 247-48 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (communications with 
ratings agencies), stay conditionally granted, 477 B.R. 465 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). 
70   See infra notes 183-189 and accompanying text. 
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seeks to give effect to the parties’ evident intent, as expressed in the language of 
the agreement, even if doing so does not result in the best literal interpretation 
(understanding, of course, courts can stray farther from the literal language by 
emphasizing other factors, such as trade practice).  As this Part shows, although 
the extent to which one or the other is referenced may be different in interpreting 
corporate financing instruments, this variation is not accompanied by 
predictability.  There remains great inconsistency and unpredictability as to which 
will be applied in interpreting corporate financing instruments. 
Much of the language of nineteenth century authority emphasizes 
literalism in interpretation of contracts.  For example: 
• “Courts have power to enforce contracts, not to make 
them.”71 
• “This court is powerless to make a new contract, but its 
province is to construe and enforce the agreement made by the parties 
themselves.”72 
•  “[T]o give [a contract] the construction claimed by the 
appellant, we must interpolate into the body of the contract words which 
the parties to it did not deem fit to incorporate. In other words, we must 
make a new contract for them. This clearly is not the province of a court. 
To construe contracts, not make new ones, is our duty.”73 
• “The intention of the parties is the pole-star of 
construction; but their intention must be found expressed in the contract 
and be consistent with rules of law. The courts will not make a new 
contract for the parties, nor will words be forced from their real 
signification.”74  
• “This court cannot interpolate what the contract does not 
contain.”75 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71   Burbank v. Wood, 12 Haw. 591, 598 (1862). 
72   Te Poel v. Shutt, 78 N.W. 288, 289 (Neb. 1889). 
73   Cheney v. Barber, 1 Colo. 256 260 (1871). 
74   I JOHN BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 357 (1871). 
75   Sheets v. Selden, 74 U.S. 416, 424 (1868). 
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This nineteenth century reasoning is echoed later in the twentieth century, 
such as in Smith v. Stowell,76 which, in interpreting option rights in stock quotes 
Corpus Juris Secundum to the following effect: 
This from 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 296(3), pages 89-98 (1963), is 
also quite applicable here: “It is not within the province, function, 
duty, or power of the court to alter, revise, modi[f]y, extend, 
rewrite, or remake a contract by construction, or to make a new, 
or different, contract for the parties, whether in the guise of 
construction or otherwise; its duty is confined to the construction 
or interpretation of the one which they have made for 
themselves.  
* * * 
The court may not rewrite the contract for the purpose of 
accomplishing that which, in its opinion, may appear proper, or, 
on general principles of abstract justice, or under the rule of liberal 
construction, make for the parties a contract which they did not 
make for themselves, or make for them a better contract than they 
chose, or saw fit, to make for themselves, or remake a contract, 
under the guise of construction, because it later appears that a 
different agreement should have been consummated in the first 
instance, or in order to meet special circumstances or 
contingencies against which the parties have not protected 
themselves. 
Likewise, the court may not alter a contract for the benefit of one 
party and to the detriment of the other or others, or make a new 
contract at the instance of one of the parties, or, by a process of 
interpretation, relieve one of the parties from the terms to which 
he voluntarily consented, or, because of equitable considerations, 
obviate objections which might have been foreseen and guarded 
against,  . . . .”77 
One may describe continued adherence to this interpretative approach as 
vestigial literalism.  That approach may be contrasted with more modern statements 
such as the following from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: “Words and 
other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76   125 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1964). 
77   Id. at 799 n.4. 
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principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight.”78  
American General Corp. v. Continental Airlines Corp.79 provides a more detailed 
articulation of a modern approach emphasizing the purposes manifested by the 
language used.  In a case construing anti-dilution and anti-destruction provisions 
in warrants, the Delaware Chancery Court noted that: 
Despite the existence of separate parts, a contract 
is to be considered as a whole and its meaning 
gathered from the entire context, and not from 
particular words, phrases or clauses, or from 
detached or isolated portions of the contract.  In 
order to determine the meaning of each part, the 
entire agreement must be considered.  Thus, a 
“meaning which arises from a particular portion of 
an agreement cannot control the meaning of the 
entire agreement where such inference runs 
counter to the agreement’s overall scheme or 
plan.”80 
Thus, in some contexts, courts apply the more modern principles in 
interpreting corporate financing agreements.  However, vestigial literalism at 
times prevails as the method of interpretation,81 sometimes by virtue of enhanced 
deference to precedents, and at other times apparently because the evident 
purposes underlying the pertinent contractual provisions are sufficiently complex 
that they cannot be recognized, resulting in retreat to literalism.  In addition, as 
Part IV shows, certain technical interpretive principles are applied 
idiosyncratically to corporate financing instruments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1981). 
79   1988 WL 7393 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 1988). 
80   Id. at *4 (citations omitted) (quoting  E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 
A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 1985)).  Accord Empire Props. Corp. v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 43 N.E.2d 25, 28 
(N.Y. 1942) (“The meaning of a writing may be distorted where undue force is given to single 
words or phrases.  We read the writing as a whole.  We seek to give to each clause its intended 
purpose in the promotion of the primary and dominant purpose of the contract.”). 
81   See generally Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1008 n. 5 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“Some commentators 
have thought some of the case law of this state unduly literal. For example, Professor Buxbaum 
has referred to Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, Del.Supr., 378 A.2d 121 (1977) as: “an opinion 
startling in its literalness even for Delaware.” Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate 
Governance, 73 Calif.L.Rev. 1671, 1694 (1985).”). 
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A. Conventional Statement in Construction of Corporate Financing Instruments of Good 
Faith or Conventional Focus on Purpose 
The modern doctrine of contract interpretation may give effect to an 
agreement’s evident purposes, and thus deemphasizes literalism, by express 
reference to purposes or by reference to the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, which builds on the parties’ evident purposes.  Although modern 
authority construing the implied covenant of good faith in the context of 
corporate financing transactions sometimes applies the principles in ways 
inconsistent with contemporary approaches, the statements of the principles 
themselves are often consistent with contemporary doctrine.  For example, one of 
the better-known cases construing the implied covenant of good faith as applied 
to corporate financing instruments, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, 
Inc.,82 restates the pertinent principles in at least four separate ways, albeit each 
generally consistent with contemporary statements in other areas: 
1. “A plaintiff always can allege a violation of an express 
covenant.  If there has been such a violation, of course, the 
court need not reach the question of whether or not an implied 
covenant has been violated.  That inquiry surfaces where, 
while the express terms may not have been technically 
breached, one party has nonetheless effectively deprived the 
other of those express, explicitly bargained-for benefits.  In 
such a case, a court will read an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing into a contract to ensure that neither 
party deprives the other of ‘the fruits of the agreement.’”83 
2. “[T]he implied covenant will only aid and further the explicit 
terms of the agreement and will never impose an obligation 
‘which would be inconsistent with other terms of the 
contractual relationship.’”84 
3. “Viewed another way, the implied covenant of good faith is 
breached only when one party seeks to prevent the contract’s 
performance or to withhold its benefits.  As a result, it thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82   716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
83   Id. at 1516-17 (emphasis in original). 
84   Id. at 1517 (quoting Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987)). 
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ensures that parties to a contract perform the substantive, 
bargained-for terms of their agreement.”85 
4. “[A] promise by the defendant should be implied only if the 
court may rightfully assume that the parties would have 
included it in their written agreement had their attention been 
called to it . . . .”86 
The articulation of the principles governing the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in a number of other cases construing corporate financing 
instruments is similarly conventional.87  
Although some authority relied upon by Metropolitan Life involves 
corporate transactions,88 other authority the court relies upon addresses contracts 
or contexts not implicating the law of corporate finance or corporate law, e.g., 
construction of a sublease,89 an employment relationship,90 and covenants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85   Id. at 1517 (citation omitted). 
86   Id.at 1521 (quoting Neuman v. Pike, 591 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
87   E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (“This implied covenant means that ‘neither party shall do anything which will have the 
effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.’”) 
(quoting Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1383-85 (2d Cir. 1975)); In re Sunstates Corp. 
S’holder Litig., 788 A.2d 530, 535 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[T]he duty [arising from the implied covenant] 
arises only where it is clear from what the parties expressly agreed, that they would have proscribed 
the challenged conduct as a breach of contract . . . had they thought to negotiate with respect to 
the matter.” (quoting Dave Greytak Enters., Inc. v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 622 A.2d 14, 22-
23 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 609 A.2d 668 (Del. 1992)) (emphasis added in Sunstates)); Lohnes v. Level 3 
Commc’ns, Inc., 272 F.3d 49, 61 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This implied covenant forbids a party from 
doing ‘anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the rights of the other party to 
receive the fruits of the contract.’” (quoting Druker v. Roland Wm. Jutras Assocs., 348 N.E.2d 
763, 765 (Mass. 1976))).  See generally Tauke, supra note 4, at 131 (“In refusing to create substantive 
protections for bondholders under the implied covenant of good faith the courts certainly seem to 
be justified.”).   
88   See Neuman v. Pike, 591 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1979) (agreement governing management of close 
corporation) (statement (4)). 
89   See Greenwich Village Assocs. v. Salle, 110 A.D.2d 111, 493 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1985) (statement 
(1)). 
90   See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987) (statement (2)); Wakefield 
v. N. Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985) (statement (3)). 
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governing real estate development.91  So, in articulating standards, the opinion is 
not constrained to authority construing corporate financing instruments.   
1. Outcome in Metropolitan Life consistent with modern principles   
The actual outcome in Metropolitan Life does not seem idiosyncratic in 
applying principles of good faith.  Peculiar facts militated against the creation of 
an implied duty under any standard.  The case included a claim that an issuer’s 
incurrence of additional debt, as part of a leveraged buy-out, violated the implied 
covenant of good faith.  The court held a prohibition on incurring additional 
indebtedness was not implied.92   
The claims involved six classes of debt securities.93  Two of the classes 
had originally “restricted the company’s ability to incur precisely the sort of debt 
involved in the recent LBO.”94  The limits on indebtedness were eliminated in 
exchange for various changes the holder then thought desirable, in one case 
receipt of a parent guaranty and in the other providing an indenture that would 
facilitate public resale of the debt.95 
The court rightly noted that the incongruity of finding an implied limit on 
the issuer’s incurrence of indebtedness “where, as here, that very term—a 
limitation on the incurrence of additional debt—has in other past contexts been 
expressly bargained for.  . . .”96  And the opinion, in language that is easily elided, 
indicated this peculiar context may be outcome-determinative: 
It is not necessary to decide that indentures like 
those at issue could never support a finding of 
additional benefits, under different circumstances 
with different parties.  Rather, for present 
purposes, it is sufficient to conclude what 
obligation is not covered, either explicitly or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91   See Collard v. Inc. Vill. of Flower Hill, 427 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Div. 1980) (statement (3)). 
92   Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).  See also 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(reaching a similar result). 
93   Metro. Life Ins., 716 F. Supp. at 1510. 
94   Id. 
95   Id. 
96   Id. at 1519. 
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implicitly, by these contracts held by these 
plaintiffs.97 
It bears mention that the outcome modernly often is referenced without 
limiting its application to circumstances where the bonds being interpreted had 
previously been amended to eliminate covenants inhibiting refinancing.98  We 
shall see other illustrations of “abstraction,” where courts treat interpretation of 
corporate financing instruments as involving principles to be applied divorced 
from the language or context giving rise to the initial authority.99  
The context of the dispute in Metropolitan Life is compelling for excluding 
an implied duty.  The case thus does not present an opportunity for illuminating 
any difference in application of the standard in corporate financing transactions.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97   Id. (emphasis in original).  Some dissonance is created by this part of the opinion.  The court 
elsewhere quoted with approval, Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 
(2d Cir. 1982), as supporting the proposition that indenture covenants “do not depend upon 
particularized intentions of the parties to an indenture” and there are “no adjudicative facts 
relating to the parties.”  Metro. Life Ins., 716 F. Supp. at 1515.  The quoted language would indicate 
particularized intentions are relevant. 
98   See In re Loral Space & Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Litig., Nos. 2808-VCS, 3022-VCS, 2008 WL 
4293781, at *36 n.190 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008).  Loral quoted a textbook to the following effect:  
“Metropolitan sued [RJR] arguing that [its pre-LBO] bonds contained an implied covenant 
preventing major financing changes that would undercut existing bondholders.  However, 
Metropolitan lost: The courts held that only the written covenants count.”  Id. (quoting RICHARD A. 
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 713 (7th ed. 2003)) (first 
and second emphases in Loral; first emphasis in textbook). Loral further noted, “Although that 
conclusion may be too simplified from a legal perspective, its general point is useful for 
understanding the view on implied covenants in the financial community.”  2008 WL 4293781, at 
*36 n.190.  There are additional illustrations of discussions attributing to Metripolitan Life a holding 
lacking nuance.  E.g., Jonathan Friedland et al., The Dealmaker’s Guide to Buying Distressed Assets—
Section 363 Sales and the Alternatives, in NORTON’S ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, 183 
n.15 (2008) (“Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D. N.Y. 1989) 
(explaining that corporation was entitled to incur new debt in order to complete LBO, and 
bondholders had no basis for recovery absent a term in the indenture limiting such action)”); 
Thomas O. McGimpsey & Darren R. Hensley, Successor Obligor Clauses: Transferring “All or 
Substantially All” Corporate Assets in Spin-Off Transactions, COLO. LAW., 45, 48 (Feb. 2001) (discussing 
the case without emphasizing this aspect of the circumstances); F. John Stark, III, et al., “Marriott 
Risk”:  A New Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers of Wealth from Bondholders to Stockholders, 1994 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 503, 515 (“[T]he [Metropolitan Life] court sent a message to the investment 
world—bondholders must negotiate sound restrictive covenants, because courts will not imply 
covenants that are not bargained for.”). 
99   See infra Part IV.B. 
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A number of cases apply modern interpretive principles in construction of 
corporate financing instruments, although they do not consistently do so.  The 
circumstances where courts apply these modern interpretive principles to 
corporate financing agreements seem typically to include: (i) cases where the 
interpretive question was not previously addressed (i.e., not addressed when 
courts were generally more inclined to follow literalism); and (ii) circumstances 
not involving some selected recognized and disapproved forms of evasion of 
contractual rights.100  We may first turn to cases applying modern interpretive 
principles. 
2. Sale of participation   
Empresas Cablevisión, S.A.B. de C.V. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank101 involved a 
loan agreement, ninety percent of which the lender, JPMorgan, sought to assign 
to a firm, Inbursa, which was controlled by the borrower’s competitor.  The loan 
agreement required the borrower’s, Cablevisión, consent for any assignment, 
which the borrower did not provide.  The lender sought to evade the consent 
requirement by merely selling that firm a participation in the loan,102 with terms 
granting the buyer of the participation atypical access to information.  The court, 
on a motion for preliminary injunction, found a likelihood of success on the 
merits on a claim that the acts would violate the implied covenant of good faith, 
noting:  
[E]very contract “embraces a pledge that ‘neither 
party shall do anything which will have the effect 
of destroying or injuring the right of the other 
party to receive the fruits of the contract.’”  The 
facts presently before the Court make out a very 
strong showing that JPMorgan, after failing to 
obtain Cablevisión’s consent to an assignment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100   The below collection of authority is illustrative, not exhaustive.  See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase 
Bank v. Baupost Grp, LLC (In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.), 380 B.R. 307, 315-16 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that the term “corporation” in 1987 indenture included corporations, 
voluntary associations, joint stock companies and business trusts). 
101   680 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), modified, 381 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2010). 
102   Francis D. Logan et al., The Securitization of U.S. Bank Activities in the Eurodollar Market—Issues 
for U.S. Counsel, 11 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 539, 544-45 (1986), describes a loan participation 
as follows:  “In a loan participation the lender originates the loan, then ‘sells’ a share to another 
entity without recourse. . . . By acquiring a participation, the participant becomes entitled to 
receive a specified portion of the borrower’s principal and interest payments on the participated 
loan, but only if and when the seller qua lender receives the payments from the borrower.” 
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90% of the loan to Inbursa, negotiated an 
agreement with Inbursa that, while it took the 
form of a participation, gave Inbursa much of the 
substance of the forbidden assignment and 
purposely undercut what JPMorgan knew the 
assignment veto was designed to prevent.  Such an 
end-run, if not a downright sham, is not 
permissible if, as here, it does away with the 
“fruits” of the contract.103 
3.   Subordination   
Modern judicial interpretation of subordination provisions de-emphasize 
literalism.  A subordination provision is one in which certain creditors agree that 
they will be paid only after another class of creditors is paid.  These provisions 
can be very complicated, because they may address not only distributions in 
liquidation but also complicated distributions in connection with reorganizations.   
 In re Envirodyne Industries, Inc., involves one of those complicated 
circumstances, where a plan of reorganization for an issuer provided for 
distribution of stock evidently in cancelation of certain existing senior and 
subordinated indebtedness.104  The business deal underlying subordination is that, 
if the senior indebtedness is not to be paid in full, e.g. in liquidation, junior 
indebtedness is to receive nothing.  However, holders of the subordinated 
indebtedness in this case claimed, based on a literal reading of the subordination 
provisions, that they were entitled to a proportionate share of the distribution of 
stock.105 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103   Empresas Cablevisión, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 631-32 (quoting Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 663 
N.E.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. 1995)) (citations omitted).  A permanent injunction was ultimately entered.  
Empresas Cablevisión, S.A.B. de C.V. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 09 Civ. 9972 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. July 
23, 2010). 
104   29 F.3d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1994).  The opinion describes the payment as “partial.”  Review of 
the lower court opinion confirms “partial” was not used to mean the senior creditors retained 
their claims (unaltered) for senior debt and received these distributions in lieu of some of the 
payments then due on them.  Rather, the senior claims were extinguished in exchange for receipt 
of the common stock.  See In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 161 B.R. 440, 443-44 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1993), aff’d, 29 F.3d 301. 
105   In re Envirodyne, 29 F.3d at 303, 306.  The opinion further recites: 
That indenture provided that in the event of a default, “all Superior 
Indebtedness” . . . “shall first be paid in full before the Noteholders, or the 
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The court rejected the claim and implemented the basic purpose of the 
subordination—not allowing the appellant junior creditors to receive distributions 
pro rata—although noting the junior creditors perhaps had the better of the 
argument as to the literal reading of the provisions: “On balance the appellants 
have the better of the purely semantic argument.  But their interpretation makes 
no sense once the context of the terminology being interpreted is restored.”106 
These subordination provisions are complicated to draft.  The Envirodyne 
approach is followed in In re Dura Automotive Systems, Inc., where the court settles 
on a similar outcome, albeit one where the court has to interpret similarly unclear 
language.107  That is not to say that all interpretations of subordination provisions 
are thoughtful and give effect to the evident intent of the parties.108  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Trustee, shall be entitled to retain any assets (other than shares of stock of the 
Company, as reorganized or readjusted or securities of the Company or any 
other corporation provided for by a plan of reorganization or readjustment, the 
payment of which is subordinated, at least to the same extent as the Notes, to 
the payment of all Superior Indebtedness which may at the time be 
outstanding).” 
Id. at 303. 
106   Id. at 305. 
107   379 B.R. 257, 268 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (“Despite an invitation extended by this Court at oral 
argument, neither [party] would acknowledge that the X–Clause at issue here was poorly drafted. 
However, like the x-clause in Envirodyne, the X–Clause here, while not legally ambiguous, lacks the 
utter clarity that BNY and the Debtor would now surely prefer.  But, like the Envirodyne courts, in 
interpreting the contract language before me, I will: ‘read the contract as a whole and consider all parts 
of the whole and not give undue force to certain words or phrases that would distort or confuse 
the primary and dominant purpose of the contract.’” (emphasis in original)). 
This case also is one of the most express in stating that idiosyncratic principles govern 
interpretation of corporate financing instruments, in stretching the meaning of “unambiguous” to 
retain interpretation of the contract as a function for the court.  See, e.g., id. at 270 (“[T]he 
Metromedia court called the x-clause before it ‘not self-reading; the applicability of the clause in a 
specific case is not readily apparent . . . .’ The only thing missing here is actual use of the word 
‘ambiguous.’”).  Treating the language as ambiguous, and allowing a jury to interpret it, is 
understood as undesirable.  See supra text accompanying note 29.  See also Bratton, supra note 4, at 
402 (“Jury participation makes the interpretation process less certain.”). 
108   JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Baupost Grp., LLC (In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.), 380 B.R. 307, 
315-16, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), interpreted a definition of senior debt, which included the phrase 
“all indebtedness of [Enron] . . . evidenced by notes, debentures, bonds or other securities sold by 
[Enron] for money borrowed . . . .’”  The court, referencing the “rule of the last antecedent,” held 
that the qualifier “sold . . . for money borrowed” does not limit the reference to “notes, 
debentures, [or] bonds.”  Id.  This approach is simply foolish.  The reason the definition of senior 
debt references obligations for “money borrowed” is that only creditors of the type that provide a 
better business deal by virtue of being senior are to be given senior status.  
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4.  No-action and no-recourse provisions   
Indentures often contain so-called no-action provisions109 and no-
recourse provisions.  There are a number of purpose-focused interpretations of 
no-action and no-recourse provisions, and provisions granting a trustee the power 
to pursue claims on behalf of bondholders.   
Under a no-action provision, individual bondholders cannot initiate 
certain lawsuits.  For publicly issued bonds, the provision cannot limit lawsuits for 
scheduled principal or, with exceptions not normally present, interest.110  But the 
provisions will address, for example, breach of a financial covenant.  They will 
require that if bondholders wish to pursue a covered claim, they must hold a 
specified amount of the bonds and first unsuccessfully request that the trustee 
bring suit.  The point is to have such claims brought on behalf of all bondholders 
to avoid inconsistent judicial determinations, strike suits and the like.111 
An indenture will also have a complementary provision granting the 
trustee the right to maintain claims on behalf of the bondholders.  These two 
provisions need to be construed in harmony with each other.  It is obviously 
problematic if the bondholders cannot directly bring a claim and the trustee also 
has not been given the authority to bring the claim on behalf of bondholders.  
Such a gap would indirectly eliminate liability for certain causes of action.  
A no-recourse provision limits the extent to which claims may be brought 
against persons other than the primary obligor, i.e., the issuer.  The precise details 
vary among contracts, including the extent to which they purport to bar pursuit 
of claims other than breach of contract. 
In interpreting these provisions, a thoughtful court will consider the 
interaction between the two and will conform its interpretation to avoid the 
implicit elimination of liability, i.e., reference the evident purpose.  U.S. Bank 
National Ass’n v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C.112 presents another 
illustration of a court giving effect to evident purposes, in this case also expressly 
declining to follow precedent.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109   See generally Kahan, supra note 34, at 1050-51 (discussing scope of these provisions). 
110   15 U.S.C § 77ppp (2013). 
111   See AM. BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 232-33 (1971) (allowing for ratable 
benefit and limit to meritorious lawsuits).  See also Drage v. Santa Fe Pac. Corp., No. 67966, 1995 
WL 396370, at *10-11 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 1995) (citing the Commentaries on Indentures). 
112   864 A.2d 930 (Del. Ch. 2004), vacated, U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n, 875 A.2d 632 (Del. 2005). 
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The court noted no-action provisions substantially the same as those 
included in the indenture in question had been construed in Delaware as barring 
noteholders from bringing non-contractual claims without satisfying the demand 
requirement of the no-action clause.113  The court identified a preference for 
deference to prior interpretations of corporate financing instruments from other 
jurisdictions.  It concluded, however, that it could not, because that would 
produce “absurd” results.114 
A number of other courts also avoided literal construction of no-action 
provisions, allowing securityholders to bring claims literally barred by the contract 
provisions where the trustee had a conflict of interest115 or otherwise 
unreasonably refused to bring a claim,116 although there is some other, curiously 
putatively literal, construction of these provisions.117 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113   Id. at 940. 
114  Id. at 942 (“While this court is reluctant to interpret the provisions of a trust indenture 
differently from another court interpreting substantially the same provision, to do otherwise 
would require the court either to drastically restrict the scope of the no-action clause, as 
interpreted in prior decisions of this court, or render the operation of that clause absurd.”).  The 
absurd outcome the court rejects is one Kahan references as potentially present and problematic.  
Kahan, supra note 34, at 1074.  Of course, that this well-known commentator identifies this as a 
problem, suggesting it will not be adequately addressed in interpretation, evidences the lack of 
predictability of the law in this area. 
115   Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 111 N.Y.S.2d 539, 547 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (holding that a 
trustee conflict of interest excuses compliance with no-action provision).  Accord Akanthos Capital 
Mgmt., LLC v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp., 677 F.3d 1286, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2012). 
116   Birn v. Childs Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 689, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (holding that an unreasonable refusal 
of trustee to sue excused compliance with no-action provision, where the plaintiff held bearer 
bonds, making it difficult to locate the required percentage of bonds).  See also Ettlinger 
v.Schumacher., 36 N.E. 1055 (N.Y. 1894) (allowing lawsuit where the trustee was absent from the 
country and probably insane).  There have long been provisions limiting direct action by 
bondholders.  See Seibert v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 53 N.W. 1134, 1136 (Minn. 1893) 
(discussing such a provision). 
117   Tang Capital Partners, LP v. Norton, 2012 WL 3072347 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2012), involved 
whether a no-action clause prevented claims seeking appointment of a receiver.  The indenture 
expressly provided: 
[N]o Holder of any Note shall have any right by virtue of or by availing of any 
provision of this Indenture to institute any suit, action or proceeding in equity 
or at law upon or under or with respect to this Indenture, or for the 
appointment of a receiver, . . . or for any other remedy hereunder, unless 
[certain pre-suit requirements are met]. 
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Id. at *5.  The court held those claims were barred, an outcome that it described as consistent with 
prior authority, Noble v. European Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 165 A. 157 (Del. Ch. 1933), which held a 
no-action clause did not preclude a receivership action because the contract provided: 
Nothing in this Section or elsewhere in this indenture . . . shall affect or impair 
the obligation of the Company, which is unconditional and absolute, to pay the 
principal and interest of the bonds . . . nor affect or impair the right of action, 
which is also absolute and unconditional, of such holders to enforce such 
payment. 
Id. at 158.  Tang Capital Partners indicated that the Noble indenture “reserved to plaintiffs the right 
to commence actions relating broadly to payment of amounts owed,” and, as to the indenture in 
Tang Capital Partners, “[n]either does the Indenture here contain such a reservation.”  2012 WL 
3072347 at *7.  The following language was incorporated by reference into the Tang Capital 
Partners indenture: 
[T]he right of any holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the 
principal of and interest on such indenture security, on or after the respective 
due dates expressed in such indenture security, or to institute suit for the 
enforcement of any such payment on or after such respective dates, shall not be 
impaired or affected without the consent of such holder . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 77ppp; see also Savient Pharmaceuticals, Prospectus re. $200,000,000 4.75% 
Convertible Senior Notes due 2018, at 49 (Feb. 1, 2011) (referencing incorporation of terms set 
forth in the Trust Indenture Act of 1939).  When one has to compare dense language like this, the 
way to proceed is to reduce the language into its components.  Simplifying the language from Tang 
Capital Partners results in the following: 
[T]he right of any holder to receive payment of the principal of and interest, or 
to institute suit for the enforcement of any such payment on or after such 
respective dates, shall not be impaired …. 
Further simplification yields: 
[T]he right of any holder … to institute suit for the enforcement of any such 
payment [of principal or interest] on or after such respective dates, shall not be 
impaired …. 
It is not clear to this author how that language differs materially from language in the Noble 
indenture, which the court found a basis for a different conclusion: 
Nothing in … this indenture ... shall affect or impair … the right of action, 
which is also absolute and unconditional, of such holders to enforce such 
payment. 
165 A. at 158.  Is “the right to institute suit for the enforcement of any such payment” different in 
meaning from “the right of action to enforce such payment?” 
The Tang Capital Partners court also referenced the unhelpful bromide supporting 
avoidance of constructions resulting in surplusage.  2012 WL 3072347, at *8. 
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Feldbaum v. McCrory Corp.118 also provides an interpretation of a no-action 
provision that de-emphasizes literalism.  The agreement limited the ability of a 
securityholder to “pursue any remedy with respect to this Indenture or the 
Securities.”119  The court held this prohibition extended, inter alia, to limit claims 
alleging (i) fraudulent conveyance of assets (generally addressing claims a creditor 
transferred assets without having received equivalent value in exchange)120 and (ii) 
fraud arising from an allegedly false statement made by the issuer and its affiliates 
after the bonds had been issued, allegedly causing bondholders not to sell their 
bonds and not to sue to enjoin certain allegedly improper transactions.121   
It is not clear that either of these claims was “with respect to” the 
indenture or the securities.  Each arose out of prohibitions outside the promises 
made in the indenture and the securities—fraudulent conveyance law or common 
law fraud.  The court reached the conclusion that the no-action provision limited 
initiation of these claims by securityholders based on the court’s perception as to 
the purposes of the provision—limiting bondholders bringing claims individually 
when the “trustee is capable of satisfying its obligations” and the trustee can 
enforce the claim “on behalf of all bonds.”122 
The court further referenced a “policy favoring the channeling of 
bondholder suits through trustees” as a basis for concluding that the no-action 
provisions extended to limit claims brought against persons not parties to the 
indenture, stating, “So long as the suits to be dismissed seek to enforce rights 
shared ratably by all bondholders, they should be prosecuted by the trustee.”123   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118   Nos. 11866, 11920, 12006, 1992 WL 119095 (Del. Ch. June 1, 1992). 
119   Id. at *5. 
120   See generally, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, First Principles and Fair Consideration: The Developing Clash 
Between the First Amendment and the Constructive Fraudulent Conveyance Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247 
(1997) (discussing the principles). 
121   Id. at 251. 
122   Feldbaum, 1992 WL 119095 at *6 (“Given the purposes for which no-action clauses are 
designed, I cannot accept plaintiffs’ position.  No principled reason or factual particularity of this 
case is advanced that would justify this view.  In my opinion, no matter what legal theory a 
plaintiff advances, if the trustee is capable of satisfying its obligations, then any claim that can be 
enforced by the trustee on behalf of all bonds, other than a claim for the recovery of past due 
interest or principle [sic], is subject to the terms of a no-action clause of this type.”). 
123   Id. at *6 (also claiming literal support from the language of the provision, asserting 
“Moreover, like other no-action clauses, the clauses at issue here explicitly make their scope 
depend on the nature of the claims brought, not on the identity of the defendant.”). 
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Very similar contract language is construed inconsistently—not requiring 
channeling of claims through the trustee—in LaSalle National Bank v. Perelman.124  
The court described the contract as including “no recourse provisions [that] 
exempt directors, officers and stockholders from liability ‘for any obligations of 
the Company or the Trustee under the Securities or the Indenture or for any 
claim based on, in respect of or by reason of such obligation or their creation.’”125  
The court held that this provision did not bar assertion of claims of veil piercing 
and that dividends constituted wrongful transfers, among other claims.126  It 
somewhat directly eschewed seeking to tie the outcome to the language of the 
provision.  Instead, the court cited other authority for the proposition “that the 
Geyer [v. Ingersoll Publications Co.] court did not rely on the word ‘hereunder’ or 
any specific language of the provision in limiting the provision to contract claims.  
Instead, the Chancery Court generally held that no recourse provisions are limited 
to contract claims . . . .”127 
So, for some purposes, claims that allege actions defraud creditors pursue 
remedies “with respect to” an indenture or the securities (Feldbaum), but, in other 
circumstances, claims that allege actions defrauding creditors do not pursue 
remedies  “under the Securities or the Indenture or for any claim based on, in 
respect of or by reason of such obligation” (LaSalle).  We shall see other 
circumstances in which courts treat contractual provisions in corporate financing 
instruments as concepts merely suggested by, and not controlled by, the actual 
language of the provisions.128 
5. Recognized schemes for evasion of contractual obligations   
Courts have identified certain categories of prohibited acts issuers can 
take to avoid promises in corporate financing instruments.  So, if the issuer’s acts 
can be placed in one of these categories, there is a significantly greater likelihood 
that actions allegedly literally permitted will be treated as violating the pertinent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124   141 F. Supp. 2d 451 (D. Del. 2001). 
125   Id. at 459. 
126   Id. at 457, 462-63. 
127   Id. at 461 (citing Geyer v. Ingersoll Pub’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992)).  See also Howe 
v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 783 F. Supp. 2d 466, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that indenture 
provision limiting lawsuits “with respect to this Indenture, or for any other remedy hereunder” 
does not limit claim brought against trustee alleging breach of fiduciary duty or taking “extra-
contractual action”). 
128   See infra Part IV.B.  
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agreement, although this categorization is not necessarily sufficient. The primary 
categories include an invasion of contractual provisions by dividing an act into 
multiple steps (step-transaction) and acting through a subsidiary.129  In addition, if 
the acts are amenable to characterization as a “sham,” the acts may be found to 
be prohibited. 
These principles are primarily used in connection with other 
circumstances, such as ascertaining compliance with tax law (step transaction)130 
or determining whether the corporate veil should be pierced for creditors 
generally (not respecting the corporate form, which is at the heart of extending 
promises to bind subsidiaries of a promisor).  It may be the fact that deviation 
from literalism has been recognized in contexts outside interpretation of contracts 
gives additional, necessary impetus to a desire to extend non-literal contractual 
interpretation to various aspects of corporate financing contracts. 
Step transaction.  A number of cases have addressed dividing acts into 
multiple steps in connection with reviewing consideration receivable upon 
exercise of warrants following an issuer’s merger.  Noddings Investment Group, Inc. v. 
Capstar Communications, Inc.131 involved an issuer of stock purchase warrants that 
spun-off shares of a subsidiary followed by a cash-out merger.  The warrants did 
not contain express adjustment provisions for a spin-off,132 though they did for a 
merger.133  The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the two steps were to be 
integrated (not respected as separate transactions), so that warrants, following the 
merger, were to be exercisable for both the spun-off shares and the cash 
consideration delivered in the merger.134  There is other, similar authority in one 
case that concerned a cash dividend paid before a merger,135 and in another case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129   Buxbaum’s 1954 article notes the problem.  Richard M. Buxbaum, Preferred Stock—Law and 
Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 257 (1954) (“As to all these clauses, it is vital that all 
payments, distributions, acquisitions, etc., include those of subsidiaries; otherwise the provisions 
can be totally avoided.”). 
130   See supra note 64. 
131   No. 16538, 1999 WL 182568 (Del. Ch. Mar. 24, 1999). 
132   Id. at *1. 
133   Id. at *3 n.12. 
134   Id. at *6-7 (referencing principles of the “step transaction doctrine” principles followed in tax 
law). 
135   See Gandal v. Telemundo Grp., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 39, 47-48 (D.D.C. 1992) (describing the 
cash payment as a “dividend only in name, not in substance”), rev’d in part on other grounds, Gandal 
v. Telemundo Grp., Inc., 997 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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that involved certain supplemental rights given to employee stockholders in 
connection with a merger.136   
In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co.137 followed a similar approach in construing 
a successor liability provision.  The court, reviewing a special master’s report, 
opined as to a covenant requiring a firm that acquires all the issuer’s assets assume 
the issuer’s debt obligations “that a trial court would be justified in viewing these 
separate transactions as parts of a single scheme.”138 
Alleco, Inc. v. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co.139 similarly recharacterized 
multiple steps, in that case in connection with interpreting a covenant restricting 
dividends, as well as redemptions or repurchases of stock.  The court held that a 
leveraged buy-out of an issuer, effected by a tender-offer, resulting in ownership 
of ninety-four percent of the issuer,140 followed by a merger, constitutes a 
dividend as restricted by a covenant in the target’s outstanding debt securities.141  
In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the economic substance of the 
transaction and the purpose of the covenant restricting dividends:  “If sections 
like [this covenant] are to have any meaning, courts must consider the substance 
of the disputed transaction.”142 
Acting through a subsidiary.  An issuer may seek to avoid compliance with 
covenants by acting through a subsidiary.  Authority is inconsistent as to whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136   See Am. Gen. Corp. v. Cont’l Airlines Corp., 1988 WL 7393 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 1988). 
137   61 F. Supp. 11, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff’d, 149 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1945). 
138   Id.  See also U.S. Bank N.A. v. Angeion Corp., 615 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(discussing multiple transactions in reversing trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
issuer; plaintiff claimed that the transactions constituted sale of substantially all the issuer’s assets, 
triggering a repurchase option).  Whether the transactions can be collapsed may depend on 
whether they were part of an overall plan or “discrete, context-based decisions.”  But cf. Bank of 
N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 29 A.3d 225, 243-44 (Del. 2011) (affirming 
Chancery Court’s determination that multiple transactions were not sufficiently “connected” to 
warrant aggregating them in construing a successor obligor provision in an indenture; reserving 
determination whether New York would follow the step-transaction doctrine in construing 
successor obligor provisions).  See generally Bank of N.Y. v. Tyco Int’l Grp., S.A., 545 F. Supp. 2d 
312 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (examining spin-off and successor clause).  The analysis is something at odds 
with the principles underlying the Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance.  See generally supra 
notes 59-63 and accompanying text. 
139   745 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Minn. 1989). 
140   L.P. Acquisition Holds 94% of Alleco After Tender Offer, DOW JONES NEWS SERV., Sept. 14, 1988.  
141   Alleco, 745 F. Supp. at 1474-75. 
142   Id. at 1475. 
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acts of a subsidiary are treated as acts of the parent/issuer for purposes of 
corporate financing instruments.   
The Delaware Chancery Court held in In re Sunstates Corp. Shareholder 
Litigation143 that a charter provision preventing an issuer’s purchasing stock does 
not prohibit purchases made by the issuer’s subsidiaries.  The court expressly 
rejected finding that this violates the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
Roeston OL, LLC v. Dynegy Holdings Inc.144 addressed whether a limit on a 
corporation’s transfer of assets restricted asset transfers by subsidiaries.  Roeston 
indicated “No.”  The court found that a creditor was unlikely to succeed—and 
denied a temporary restraining order145—in a claim that a covenant restricting 
transfer of a guarantor’s assets146 restricted transfers of assets by the guarantor’s 
subsidiaries.  The plan involved contributing assets to newly-formed entities 
designed to be bankruptcy-remote and that could separately borrow,147 which 
would effectively (structurally)148 subordinate claims against the guarantor to those 
future creditors. 
Yet courts are not consistent in treating acts of a subsidiary as acts of the 
parent for purposes of covenants.  So, there is authority to the opposite effect of 
Roeston.149  And the court in Shenandoah Life Insurance Co. v. Valero Energy Corp. 
indicated (in dicta) that an issuer would violate a restriction on refinancing with 
lower-rate debt by distributing assets to a subsidiary that borrowed money and 
distributed the funds to the parent/issuer.150   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143   788 A.2d 530, 535 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
144   No. 6689-VCP, 2011 WL 3275965 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2011). 
145   Id. at *1. 
146   The pertinent language is, “The Guarantor shall not consolidate with or merge into any other 
Person, or convey, transfer or lease its properties and assets substantially as an entirety to any 
Person in one or a series of transactions ….” Id. at *3. 
147   See id. at *6. 
148   Structural subordination refers to the fact that creditors of a parent corporation are, by virtue 
of the corporate structure, effectively subordinated to creditors of a subsidiary (to the extent of 
assets in the subsidiary).  See Stark et al., supra note 98, at 517 n.52 (discussing structural 
subordination). 
149   See HFTP Invs., L.L.C. v. Grupo TMM, S.A., 18 A.D.3d 369, 795 N.Y.S.2d 555 (2005). 
150   Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., No. 9032, 1988 WL 63491, at *20-22 (Del. 
Ch. June 21, 1988).  The court states that act would “likely be found to violate such an implied 
duty even if there were no ‘indirectly’ language in the restriction.”  Id. at *8. 
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Sham.  We have already encountered one case, Empresas Cablevisión, S.A.B. 
de C.V. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,151 referencing categorization of a transaction as a 
“sham” as a basis for extending a promise beyond its literal terms.152  In addition, 
Birn v. Childs Co.153 supports the notion that effect will not be given to a sham 
designed to avoid promises in an indenture.  It is common for an indenture to 
provide that an issuer can satisfy an obligation to redeem a portion of outstanding 
bonds (called a “sinking fund”) by purchasing the securities in the market and 
delivering the repurchased securities to the trustee for cancelation. The Birn court 
held that delivering to a trustee securities that had been authenticated but never 
issued could not be used to satisfy a sinking fund obligation.154     
6. Corresponding statutory language  
These classes of transactions—transactions divided into multiple steps, 
actions taken by a subsidiary, and sham transactions—do not exhaust the 
circumstances where courts may take a non-literal approach in interpreting 
corporate financing instruments.  Courts also exhibit greater flexibility in 
interpreting these provisions where the language in question is also used in a 
statute.  For example, state corporation law will regulate a corporation’s payment 
of dividends (prohibiting their payment if resulting in the firm’s insolvency or the 
like).155  Repurchases of stock will also be regulated under state corporation law.156  
One gets the sense that the desire to retain discretion in construing the terms in 
the statutory context carries-over to interpreting the same terms when used in 
corporate financing agreements.  Whether that is the reason, or whether there is 
some other, in corporate financing instruments these terms are construed less 
literally than other language.  Dividends restricted by corporate financing 
instruments may be found to have been effected by: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151   680 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 381 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2010).  See supra notes 101-
103 and accompanying text. 
152   See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text. 
153   37 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. 1942). 
154   Id. at 695. 
155   See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 3 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 
20:12 (Westlaw through Dec. 2012) (“Every state statutorily restricts the directors’ authority to 
make dividend distributions based on the corporation’s financial condition.”). 
156   Id. at § 21:4 (discussing statutory restrictions on repurchases). 
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• A corporation’s cancelation of a tax-sharing agreement 
with its parent, thereby eliminating an obligation of the parent;157  
• A two-step leveraged buy-out taking the form of a tender 
offer followed by a merger;158  
• A corporation’s discharge of its parent’s obligation;159 and 
• An extension of credit to a control person, used to acquire 
the issuer’s stock.160 
B. Inconsistency in Reference to Purposes 
1.   Anti-dilution and anti-destruction   
Although some authority applies modern interpretive principles to 
corporate financing instruments in ways that are comparable to their application 
to other agreements, that is not universal.  As discussed above, a number of cases 
treat corporate financing contracts and other agreements differently in 
determining whether an adjustment arising from a split or a reverse split of stock 
should be implied.  Reiss v. Financial Performance Corp.,161 among other cases,162 held 
an adjustment should not be implied in a corporate financing instrument, whereas 
other authority not addressing corporate financing instruments found an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157   See FDIC v. First Heights Bank, 229 F.3d 528, 539 (6th Cir. 2000). 
158   See Alleco, Inc. v. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 745 F. Supp. 1467, at 1474-75 (D. Minn. 
1989); Alleco Inc., Lapides Corp. Completes Alleco Inc. Tender Offer (PR Newswire, Sept. 14, 
1988) (Lexis, Wires file). 
159   See Bell Bakeries, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 96 S.E.2d 408 (N.C. 1957) 
(affirming nonsuit following plaintiff’s evidence). 
160   Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 542 n.89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that an extension of credit 
constituted a redemption for purposes of Delaware General Corporation Law § 160 and “likely” 
constituted a repurchase under a charter provision), vacated, Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
161   Reiss v. Fin. Performance Corp., 764 N.E.2d 958, 961 (N.Y. 2001). 
162   See Lohnes v. Level 3 Comm’cns, Inc., 272 F.3d 49, 55-61 (1st Cir. 2001) (no adjustment in 
warrant held by landlord for split effected as a stock dividend; warrant expressly provided for 
adjustments for “capital reorganization” or a “reclassification”); Smith v. Stowell, 125 N.W.2d 
795, 798 (Iowa 1964) (no adjustment to options implied where the issuer effected a 4:1 split 
through a stock dividend).  
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adjustment implied, with Cofman v. Acton Corp.163 expressly stating authority 
construing similar language in corporate financing instruments is inapposite. 
Not all aspects of anti-dilution and anti-destruction provisions in 
corporate financing contracts are construed literally.  Fluor Corp. v. Citadel Equity 
Fund, Ltd.164 provides an illustration165 in which a court addressed a defect in 
drafting, where a referenced security price was not properly defined.  The case 
held, as a matter of law, that an indenture’s reference to the “closing sale price per 
share of the Common Stock,”166 in provisions addressing property deliverable on 
conversion of bonds, was to be adjusted for a 2:1 split, where the referenced price 
per share was after the common stock traded with a “due bill” for the additional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163   958 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1992).  A number of other cases not involving construction of 
corporation financing instruments reach an outcome similar to that in Cofman.  The court in In re 
Tamaron Investments, Inc., 637 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1996), adjusted the terms of an arbitration 
award of shares of a corporation’s stock where the corporation effected a reverse split between 
the time of the arbitration hearing and the issuance of the award.  Id.  at 638-39 (“The only 
construction of the term ‘shares’ is one that conforms with what the parties and the arbitrator 
understood it to mean as of the close of evidence in March 1995. Since the arbitrator did not 
make a conscious, substantive decision to award 2000 shares of post-reverse split stock, any 
ambiguity engendered by the subsequent change in circumstances may be clarified or corrected by 
the court.”).  Smith v. Hilliard, 408 S.W.2d 440, 442-43 (Ky. 1966), involved a customer’s 
agreement to sell 100 shares of NYSE-listed stock, made after a 2:1 split had been declared and 
before the stock was trading on the exchange ex-dividend.  The exchange had issued a directive 
requiring persons selling stock would, when delivering their old certificates, need to deliver a “due 
bill” for the new shares (thereby conveying to the buyer the shares issued in the split).  The 
customer had received a check reflecting the pre-split price, and under separate cover, a 
confirmation requiring delivery of the due bill.  However, the customer had not delivered the due 
bill.  Although the requirement that the customer send the due bill had not been discussed when 
she entered her sale order, the court found principles of unjust enrichment required her to do so, 
and affirmed summary judgment for the brokerage firm.  Watson v. Santalucia, 427 S.E.2d 466, 470 
(W. Va. 1993), involved construction of legacies of specified numbers of shares of stock, which 
the court adjusted where the issuer had declared a split a few months after the instrument had 
been executed and a month before the testator’s death.  One can contrast Watson with authority 
from half a century earlier, In re Fosdick’s Trust, 152 N.E.2d 228 (N.Y. 1958) (applying a more 
formalistic approach). 
164   760 F. Supp. 2d 685, 691-93 (N.D. Tex. 2010), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 413 F. App’x 756 
(5th Cir. 2011). 
165   Fluor provides an illustration that is grasped with relative ease.  See also In re Envirodyne 
Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1994) (construing somewhat complex subordination 
provisions and stating, “On balance the appellants have the better of the purely semantic 
argument.  But their interpretation makes no sense once the context of the terminology being 
interpreted is restored.”). 
166   Fluor Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 688. 
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share.167  In reaching this conclusion, the Fluor court cited a conventional modern 
interpretative principle to subordinate a literal interpretation where appropriate to 
promote the evident purposes of the contract.168   
This outcome, although clearly reflecting the hypothetical bargain, creates 
substantial uncertainty where courts in other circumstances apply vestigial 
literalism.  When the issue involves anti-dilution protection, not all corporate 
financing contracts will be construed literally.  Even when the issue is restricted to 
the consequences of a split, in some cases the contract will be construed literally, 
and in others it will not, leaving an ill-defined dividing line. 
2.   Notice   
An additional illustration of inconsistency involves notice requirements.  
The court in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.169 held that an issuer cannot simply give the 
notice specified by contract, but is required to give additional notice where 
reasonably necessary to alert a securityholder.170  However, Lorenz v. CSX Corp. 
affirmed dismissal of a claim that an issuer was under an implied obligation to 
give notice of a spin-off, distinguishing Van Gemert on the basis that the earlier 
case involved merely making express notice more effective, whereas creation of a 
notice obligation was at-issue in Lorenz.171 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167   Id. 
168   Id. at 689 (citations omitted) (“A court must fairly and reasonably interpret the contract 
consistently with its intended purpose.  However, what the parties intended is only relevant to the 
extent that such intentions are evidenced by the language of the contract.”).  So far as this author 
is aware, the earliest case presenting this type of issue in stark detail is Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 
v. Sun Bank, No. CI 87-3985 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Orange County June 25, 1987). 
169   520 F.2d 1373, 1383 (2d Cir. 1975). 
170   Id.  
171   Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1416-17 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal 
of debentureholder claims an issuer was under an implied obligation to give the debentureholders 
advance notice of a spin-off).  In Lorenz, the issuer had transferred some assets to a subsidiary and, 
on the same day, declared a dividend spinning-off the subsidiary, to inhibit issuance of stock to 
debentureholders.  The issuer sought to avoid issuance of stock to debentureholders, because it 
thought too many holders would impose additional burdens in connection with compliance with 
the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.  Id. at 1409.  The court distinguished 
Van Gemert on the basis that finding a violation in Lorenz would require creating a new term (an 
obligation to provide notice), as opposed to merely making the expressly required notice effective.  
Id. at 1416-17.  See also Lohnes v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 272 F.3d 49, 50-51, 55-62 (1st Cir. 
2001) (holding an issuer was neither required to adjust a warrant for a 2:1 split effected as a stock 
dividend nor even to provide the warrantholder advance notice). 
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That distinction creates interpretative questions with unpredictable 
resolutions.  For example, if notice is required for a reclassification of underlying 
stock, must it be given for a merger in which the underlying stock is converted?  
Would that be a question of creating a new notice (evidently not implied under 
Lorenz) or simply giving effect to the purposes of the express notice (perhaps 
implied under Van Gemert)?  If notice is required of a merger, would it extend to 
the first step of a two-step recapitalization comprised of a very large dividend 
followed by a merger?  The distinction created by Lorenz shifts the dividing line 
between implied duties and no implied duties, but it does not eliminate 
uncertainty as to the dividing line’s location. 
3. Release of collateral   
In Rievman v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.,172 which involved two series 
of long-term, secured bonds, the court found that the bondholders had made an 
adequate showing of a likelihood of success on the merits to warrant issuance of a 
preliminary injunction restraining consummation of collateral substitution,173 even 
though the court referenced the bondholders as seeking merely to “hold-up” the 
transaction, reflecting what one might categorize as “bad faith.”174  The court 
seemed to ground its decision on a need to follow on-point precedent, and an 
increased need for certainty in interpreting corporate financing instruments.175  
This result may be contrasted both with the Restatement (Third) of Property 
(Mortgages), which would treat the debtor more favorably—providing an 
opportunity to substitute collateral (albeit not precisely the collateral at issue in 
Rievman),176 and Littlejohn v. Parrish, holding the implied covenant of good faith 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172   618 F. Supp. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
173   Id. at 602 (“Though not absolutely certain that plaintiffs would prevail on the merits at trial, 
the court is persuaded that plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing of the likelihood of success 
on the merits to warrant preliminary relief.”). 
174   Id. at 594.  Moreover, the railroad’s expert explained he could not issue a fairness opinion as 
to the terms of the offer, because he could not value the “hold-up” right.  Id. at 597. 
175   Id. at 601 (“In addition, at least one of the key cases relied on by plaintiffs cannot be 
effectively distinguished by the Railroad, and appears to govern this case. . . .  The New York 
Court of Appeals seemed to be laying down a per se rule: because of the ‘vast sums invested in 
railroad bonds’ and the need to insure investor confidence, railroad mortgage trustees may not 
‘sell, change, or in any manner compromise the security except as authorized in express terms or 
by necessary implication’—even where the sale or change would not harm the bondholders’ 
interests.”). 
176   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 6.2 (1997). 
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limited an issuer’s actions when presented with a borrower’s offer to repay a 
secured loan.177 
4. Impairing right to payment   
The Trust Indenture Act provides that the  
Right of any holder . . . to receive payment of the 
principal of and interest on such indenture 
security, on or after the respective due dates . . . or 
to institute suit for the enforcement of any such 
payment . . . shall not be impaired or affected 
without the consent of such holder.178 
Whether actions that decrease the likelihood of repayment are limited by this 
provision has received inconsistent treatment by courts. 
Federated Strategic Income Fund v. Mechala Group Jamaica Ltd.179 addressed a 
distressed issuer’s work-out involving downstreaming assets and release of 
subsidiary guarantees, leaving the issuer as a company with nominal assets.  The 
court found that the bondholders adequately established, for purposes of a 
motion seeking a preliminary injunction, that these acts would eliminate 
bondholders’ ability to recover.  Although not expressly referencing the 
“purposes” of the provisions being impaired were these acts to be consummated, 
the court found a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim that the proposed 
acts violated the Trust Indenture Act and the indenture provisions implementing 
this statute. 
Yet In re Northwestern Corp.180 followed an inconsistent approach.  
Securityholders formerly looked to payment from assets of a subsidiary.  The 
court held that upstreaming the assets (described as “going flat,”181 a description 
of collapsing a hierarchical corporate structure), resulting in the reversal of 
structural subordination of parent obligations, did not violate this provision of the 
Trust Indenture Act.  The court’s language rejected giving effect to language in a 
way that would further the securityholder’s “practical rights;” it stated this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177   Littlejohn v. Parrish, 839 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
178   15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (Westlaw through  P.L. 113-13 approved June 3, 2013). 
179   No. 99 CIV 10517 HB, 1999 WL 993648 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1999). 
180   313 B.R. 595 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004). 
181   Id. at 598. 
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provision “applies to the holder’s legal rights and not the holder’s practical rights to 
the principal and interest itself.”182 
C. Decreased Reference to the Parties’ Intent 
Subpart A collects authority where courts emphasized purposes in 
construction of corporate financing instruments.  Subpart B collects cases that 
reached inconsistent conclusions as to particular issues.  Some other authority 
impedes reference to evidence of intended purposes underlying corporate 
financing instruments were a court inclined to give effect to those purpose. 
As discussed above, certain aspects of the process by which corporate 
financing instruments are negotiated makes it more likely there will be available 
contemporaneous evidence of the parties’ intent.183  Some of that information is 
publicly available (prospectuses and news reporting), and other will be available to 
investors (a private placement memorandum and the like).  Insofar as that 
information is available to subsequent investors, it would appear referencing that 
material would enhance predictability of interpretation.  However, 
notwithstanding this increased availability of information potentially documenting 
the parties’ intent, case law diminishes reference to the parties’ intent in 
interpretation of corporate financing instruments, relative to reference to 
information relevant to that intent in other contexts.184 
The Sharon Steel court states:  
Boilerplate provisions are thus not the 
consequence of the relationship of particular 
borrowers and lenders and do not depend upon 
particularized intentions of the parties to an 
indenture.  There are no adjudicative facts relating 
to the parties to the litigation for a jury to find and 
the meaning of boilerplate provisions is, therefore, 
a matter of law rather than fact.185  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182   Id. at 600 (emphasis in original). 
183   See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
184   See generally Tauke, supra note 4, at 115-16 (“Far more often, however, courts have been willing 
to consider evidence of market understanding, even when they otherwise have been following 
fairly traditional contract interpretation principles.”). 
185   Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982).  See generally 
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The 
Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 765 (1997) (“[T]here should be no inquiry into the 
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Another court states, “[I]n interpreting boilerplate indenture provisions, ‘courts 
will not look to the intent of the parties, but rather the accepted common purpose 
of such provisions.’”186  Reflecting the decreased reference to this extrinsic 
evidence in interpretation, interpretation of these instruments is much more likely 
to be done by the court, as opposed to a jury acting as fact-finder,187 although in 
recent times there seems to be some retrenchment as to that approach.188  This 
preference for judicial interpretation seems to play some role in making a court 
less likely to find an agreement ambiguous in this context and, hence, elide 
reference to extrinsic evidence in its interpretation.189   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subjective intent of a firm that has adopted a standard term.  Interpretation of standard terms 
should be treated like the interpretation of laws:  Judges, not juries, should interpret them, and 
their interpretations should have precedential value.”). 
186   Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 29 A.3d 225, 241 (Del. 2011) (quoting 
Dennis J. Connolly & William Hao, X Marks The Spot: Contractual Interpretation of Indenture Provisions, 
17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6 Art. 1, 12 (2008)). 
187   See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 52 F. App’x 528, 530 
(2d Cir. 2002) (stating, as to construction of definition of event of default and whether 
government action excuses an event of default,  “This section is a boilerplate provision, and must 
therefore be interpreted as a matter of law.”); Leverso v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., 18 F.3d 1527, 
1534 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating, in addressing a distribution plan allocating proceeds in accordance 
with bondholders’ cost basis, “The meaning of boilerplate provisions is a matter of law and must 
be given a consistent, uniform interpretation, ‘whether it be correct or not as an initial proposition 
. . . .’” (citation omitted) (quoting Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d at 1048)); Bank of N.Y. v. Tyco Int’l Grp., 
S.A., 545 F. Supp. 2d 312, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Because of the importance of uniformity to the 
efficient functioning of capital markets, the Second Circuit held that the interpretation of 
boilerplate provisions is a matter of law and should not be submitted to a jury.”); Drage v. Santa 
Fe Pac. Corp., No. 67966, 1995 WL 396370, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 1995) (noting that “when 
a court is confronted with boilerplate provisions . . . the court is to construe such boilerplate 
provisions as a matter of law rather than fact.”). 
188   See, e.g., Okla. Police Pension & Ret. Sys. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 291 F.R.D. 47, 68 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Where the contract language is subject to more than one reasonable meaning 
and where extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent exists, the question of the proper interpretation 
should be submitted to the trier of fact, unless the extrinsic evidence is so one-sided that no 
reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.”); Whitebox Convertible Arbitrage 
Partners, L.P. v. World Airways, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1:04-CV-1350, 2006 WL 358270, at *4 n.5 
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) (stating it is a jury question to determine whether an issuer violated 
indenture provision requiring securities to be redeemed in a partial redemption to be selected for 
redemption by lot or pro rata or other fair and appropriate means, where the issuer separately 
negotiated to exchange some debentures and redeemed all debentures not so exchanged). 
189   See Shiftan v. Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., 57 A.3d 928, 935 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“In the case 
of documents like certificates of incorporation or designation, the kinds of parol evidence 
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However, as is the common theme, this principle is not consistently 
followed.  Thus, some authority references offering documents in construction of 
the terms of the corporate finance instruments.190  Other authority references 
language considered in negotiations but not ultimately included191 and what the 
parties communicated extrinsic to the writing, at least where the pertinent 
language is not categorized as “boilerplate”.192   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
frequently available in the case of warmly negotiated bilateral agreements are rarely available. 
Investors usually do not have access to any of the drafting history of such documents, and must 
rely on what is publicly available to them to understand their rights as investors.  Thus, the 
subjective, unexpressed views of entity managers and the drafters who work for them about what 
a certificate means has traditionally been of no legal consequence, as it is not proper parol 
evidence as understood in our contract law.” (internal citations omitted)).  See also supra note 107; 
Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 622 S.W.2d 239, 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (“We emphasize that our 
determination of the redemption features under the bond contract has not taken into 
consideration the Prospectus applicable to the Series 2005 Bonds.”), appeal on remand, 685 S.W.2d 
607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Hassett v. S.F. Iszard Co., 61 N.Y.S.2d 451, 455 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (“The 
prospectus and advertisements used in the promotion of the sale of the preferred stock were 
offered in evidence by the plaintiff and excluded on objection by the defendant.  This evidence 
might be competent in an action in fraud by a purchaser of stock to recover damages or rescind 
the sale, but this is not such an action.  This is an action to enforce rights based on contract, in 
which the stock certificate constitutes the contract between the parties.  The written contract is 
complete, definite and void of ambiguity. The evidence offered is incompetent and irrelevant on 
any issue involved in this case.”). 
190   Vanderbilt Income &  Growth Assocs. v. Arvida/JMB Managers, Inc., No. 15238, 1996 WL 
652773, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1996) (considering the prospectus), rev’d sub nom., 691 A.2d 609 
(Del. 1996) (holding consideration of the prospectus converted the motion to dismiss to one for 
summary judgment, requiring the Court of Chancery to afford a party an opportunity for some 
discovery before ruling); Birn v. Childs Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 689, 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942).  
191   See In re Loral Space & Commc’ns Inc., Nos. 2808-VCS, 3022-VCS, 2008 WL 4293781, at *35 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (“[A] court ‘will not imply a term where the circumstances surrounding 
the formation of the contract indicate that the parties, when the contract was made, must have 
foreseen the contingency at issue and the agreement can be enforced according to its terms.’”). 
192   In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 215 B.R. 409, 415-16 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (stating the 
negotiations leading-up to an agreement on an indenture can be considered in interpreting an 
ambiguous agreement, unless the pertinent language is “boilerplate”).  Cf. Elliott Assocs. v. J. 
Henry Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 838 F.2d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 1988) (referencing affidavit stating the 
personal knowledge of an employee of the trustee as to the purposes of a notice provision in 
construing the provision); In re Avon Sec. Litig., No. 91 Civ. 2287(LMM), 2004 WL 3761563, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2004) (referencing parties’ understandings in construction, but stating that they 
were “not of much assistance” because they were not communicated). 
288 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15 
D. Tedious Literalism 
A number of factors described above result in courts relying to a lesser 
extent on the evident purposes of contractual provisions in interpreting corporate 
financing instruments.  Some of this comes from enhanced deference to older 
precedent, decided at a time when courts were more likely to emphasize literalism 
in interpretation.  Some is a consequence of courts decreasingly referencing 
extrinsic evidence, which may bear on the evident purposes.  In addition, the 
complexity of the transactions causes the documents to contain detailed 
provisions whose purposes are less likely to be apparent to the uninitiated who 
may include judges who need not have practiced corporate financing law before 
ascending to the bench.  One consequence is tedious literalism—hyper-
literalism—–may reign in interpreting corporate financing instruments. 
1. Meaning of in lieu of   
For example, Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp.193 follows a literal approach 
in interpreting anti-dilution and anti-destruction provisions, basing the 
determination on construction of the phrase in lieu of.  The conversion rights of 
convertible preferred stock were subject to an adjustment upon a recapitalization.  
The pertinent term provided: 
(5) In the event that the Corporation shall be recapitalized, 
consolidated with or merged into any other corporation, or shall 
sell or convey to any other corporation all or substantially all of its 
property as an entirety, provision shall be made as part of the 
terms of such recapitalization, consolidation, merger, sale or 
conveyance so that any holder of . . . Preferred Stock may 
thereafter receive in lieu of the Common Stock otherwise issuable 
to him upon conversion of his . . . Preferred Stock, but at the 
conversion ratio stated in this Article . . . which would otherwise 
be applicable at the time of conversion, the same kind and amount 
of securities or assets as may be distributable upon such 
recapitalization, consolidation, merger, sale or conveyance with 
respect to the Common Stock of the Corporation.194 
The court, considering an appeal following a trial on the merits, stated, 
“The Vice Chancellor reasoned that a key phrase, ‘in lieu of,’ in the Certificate 
implies that the existing shares of Coastal common must be exchanged for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193   401 A.2d 932 (Del. 1979). 
194   Id. at 937. 
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something else before there is a ‘recapitalization’ which creates rights in the 
preferred.”195  The court affirmed, apparently relying, as did the Vice Chancellor, 
on the inclusion of “in lieu of” in the anti-dilution provisions.196 
Understanding such prolix language often requires creation of a redacted 
version, such as:  “[After a . . . recapitalization], . . . any holder of . . . Preferred 
Stock may thereafter receive in lieu of the Common Stock otherwise issuable . . . 
upon conversion . . . the same . . . securities . . . as may be distributable upon such 
recapitalization, . . . with respect to the Common Stock of the Corporation.”197  
Put more simply, “after a recapitalization, a holder converting preferred stock 
may receive in lieu of the common stock otherwise issuable on conversion the 
same securities as may be distributable upon such recapitalization with respect to 
the common stock.” 
The better way to express this type of adjustment—one provided in the 
Commentaries—is to provide that after an event triggering an adjustment, the 
securities will be convertible into the property that the holder would have had 
after the event had the securities been converted immediately prior to the 
triggering event.198  That standard language does not suffer from potential 
ambiguity. 
Some authority construes all boilerplate provisions as having a similar 
import, disregarding the implications of any deviation in the literal language.199  
Illustrating the lack of predictability of interpretation, the Wood court did not 
follow that approach.  It referenced a literal interpretation that created a 
relationship that, frankly, makes no sense. 
There is, unsurprisingly, authority construing the phrase “in lieu of.”  State 
v. Smith references “the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘in lieu of,’ which is ‘in the 
place of: instead of.’”200  To say that, after a recapitalization, preferred stock is 
“instead” convertible into whatever a holder would have possessed had the 
preferred stock been converted immediately before the recapitalization would 
have allowed treatment of the event in question as a recapitalization.  The actual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195   Id. at 936. 
196   Id. at 939-40. 
197   See id. at 937 
198   AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 111, at 552. 
199   See infra note 288 and accompanying text. 
200   779 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 1306 (1976)). 
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problem is the language in Wood referenced conversion into securities that were 
“distributable” in the triggering event, and it should also have included whatever 
was retained by common stockholders.201 
2. Definition of final maturity   
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Aames Financial Corp.202 also expressed excessive 
literalism.  This case involved an issuer bound by a limit on refinancing 
subordinated debt with new indebtedness having a maturity earlier than that of 
the senior debt.  The court approved this evasion of the purposes of this limit by 
allowing the issuer to exchange existing subordinated debt for new indebtedness, 
30% of the new indebtedness to be mandatorily redeemed almost immediately.  
This allowed the subordinated debt to receive some payment before maturity of 
senior debt, evidently with a view to allowing the subordinated debt to receive 
more than it would have received had it been paid only subsequent to payment of 
the senior debt. 
The court reached this conclusion based on a literal interpretation of the 
term “final maturity”:   
[S]ince debenture holders may not trade the 
portion of their debenture that is to be redeemed 
on December 15, 2002 separately from the rest of 
the debenture, it follows that under the Exchange 
Offer there is only one set of securities with a 
maturity date of June 15, 2012, of which a 
prorated 30% is scheduled to be redeemed on 
December 15, 2002.203   
 
Lastly, the court rejected characterizing as a sham the issuer’s right to redeem the 
remaining 70% of the bonds at any time after the mandatory redemption at 5% of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201   It bears mention that this language has another patent defect.  It provides for an adjustment 
where the issuer is merged “into” another firm, but not where it is merged “with” another firm.  
Because the stock of the survivor can be converted in a merger (as in a customary acquisition 
effected through reverse triangular merger), the failure to make an adjustment where there is a 
merger in which the issuer is the survivor is, simply, a mistake.  That there is a patent mistake as to 
part of the anti-destruction provisions would not seem to justify extending the error to another 
circumstance—concerning the definition of recapitalization—where the language does not clearly 
require it. 
202   764 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 2003). 
203   Id. at 4. 
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their principal amount, although redemption of the remainder required consent of 
the senior indebtedness.204  Understanding the bonds issued in exchange bore 
interest at over 5%, the arrangement is very difficult to distinguish, economically, 
from a prohibited early distribution to subordinated bondholders.205  It is very 
difficult to imagine parties expressly bargaining for subordination provisions 
allowing this.  
3. Surrender of securities altering payments on senior securities   
As the terms of corporate financing arrangements become more arcane, 
identification of the underlying purposes becomes more difficult.  It is, of course, 
possible that the transaction is so complex that, as to a particular issue, the 
structure of the transaction does not yield a clear implication as to an issue being 
litigated.206  Where an informed assessment of the context does not yield an 
evident purpose, it is, of course, appropriate to rely on literalism. 
However, at other times, familiarity with the context may yield an evident 
purpose as to the issue in question, although the complexity of the transaction 
may make it less likely that it will be evident to a court.  Perhaps the complexity 
of the transaction allows litigants seeking to avoid purposes more opportunity to 
hide their purpose.  In any case, it would appear courts are more likely to retreat 
to literalism when identification of evident purpose is more difficult. 
Concord Real Estate CDO 2006-1, Ltd. v. Bank of America207 is one such case.  
It involved issuance of collateralized debt obligations—various securities issued 
by a special purpose entity holding a pool of debt obligations,208 which can have 
very complex financial terms.  Various tranches (levels) of securities had been 
issued.209  If certain financial ratios based on the amount of securities outstanding 
were not met, more senior tranches would be redeemed.210  In anticipation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204   Id. 
205   See Br. For Pl.-Appellant at 3, Wilmington Trust Co. v. Aames Fin. Corp., No. 780, 2002 WL 
34246543 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 30, 2002). 
206   See Howe v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 783 F. Supp. 2d 466, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that 
a trustee’s ability to sell “defaulted” underlying collateral did not allow for the sale of securities 
allegedly “immanently about to default.”) 
207   996 A.2d 324 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
208   Id. at 327. 
209   Id. at 326. 
210   Id. at 328. 
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test being failed, an affiliate of the issuer surrendered for cancelation—
surrendered without consideration—certain junior securities, with a view to 
altering the ratio and thereby not having some of the senior securities 
redeemed.211  The trustee declined to accept them for cancelation.212  The court 
granted summary judgment to the issuer who sought a declaration that the 
securities were properly surrendered for cancelation.213   
The court did in fact reference seeking an interpretation consistent with 
the “‘plain purpose and object’ of the agreement.”214  However, the analysis does 
not seem to conform fully with that approach.  The opinion noted that the 
common law generally gave effect to a creditor’s surrender of an obligation 
without consideration (the “delivery rule”).215  The court then concluded that, 
absent a contrary provision in the indenture, the delivery rule remained in 
effect.216 
Although modern indentures for securities issued by firms that are not 
special purpose entities make express provision for cancelation of securities 
acquired by the issuer and delivered to the trustee for cancelation,217 this 
indenture did not so provide,218—an omission that would appear to be highly 
probative as to whether the parties anticipated allowing surrender of securities 
that would influence payments due on senior securities.  However, the court 
reached the opposite conclusion: 
Unlike the model provisions, Section 2.9[, 
concerning cancelation of securities,] does not 
contain the language about an issuer’s right to 
tender securities for cancellation.  Because the 
history of the model provision shows that 
language was intended to confirm the common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211   Id. at 326. 
212   Id. at 329. 
213   Id. at 339. 
214   Id. at 330 (quoting Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998)). 
215   Id. at 332. 
216   Id. at 333. 
217   See Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of the 1983 Model Simplified Indenture, Revised Model 
Simplified Indenture, 55 BUS. LAW. 1115, § 2.12 (2000) (“The Company at any time may deliver 
Securities to the Trustee for cancellation. . . . The Trustee shall cancel all Securities surrendered 
for . . . cancellation. . . .”). 
218   Concord, 996 A.2d at 335. 
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law right, the omission of the language from 
Section 2.9 does not alter the Delivery Rule.219 
 
It seems that the correct answer is that the author of the indenture simply 
did not expect the securities to be surrendered and also likely was not focused on 
any need to negate this arcane common law doctrine.  In an ordinary case, an 
issuer may buy back bonds because it may be in the issuer’s interest to do so.  It 
may satisfy a sinking-fund obligation less expensively by purchasing the bonds in 
the market, or the issuer may be able to repurchase them at below face value and 
decrease its obligations.  The terms of these transactions will be based on market 
prices. 
On the other hand, a securityholder, even an affiliate of an issuer, that 
initially holds securities as an investment (not as part of a plan to repurchase and 
retire securities) would not ordinarily be expected simply to relinquish a bond.  
Had surrender of bonds been anticipated by the author of the indenture, one 
would not expect the draftsman to have omitted from the form of indenture a 
provision that is common in model indentures allowing for cancelation of 
surrendered securities. 
Where the result of the court’s interpretation is evidently to limit the 
extent to which payments are made to more senior securityholders and there is 
not a specific provision in the indenture allowing the issuer to avoid the payments 
(redemptions) to senior securities, this author would think that the senior 
securityholders would have the better of the argument as to what was the evident 
purpose of the provision. 
4. Poison put and board approval of multiple slates of directors   
Determining whether Concord Real Estate implements the purposes 
evidenced by the agreement is a question of judgment.  This author’s view is it 
does not, though one supposes that might be a matter of debate.  San Antonio Fire 
& Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,220 on the other hand, reached 
an interpretation where subsequent events indicate the judicial outcome likely did 
not represent the parties’ evident purposes. 
The court referenced one general nature of covenants in public debt, that 
they are less intrusive covenants than covenants in credit agreements, when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219   Id. at 336. 
220   983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
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construing the public debt.  The reason, as the court noted, is that a lender’s 
rights under a credit agreement can more easily be released.221  The court 
referenced this relationship in construing a covenant (a poison put) in the public 
debt in a fashion unfavorable to the public bondholders. 
Although the court’s reference to this evident purpose is helpful, it would 
appear that another perspective on the evident purpose would have been 
appropriate.  The pertinent provision granted the holders the right to have their 
securities redeemed if there were a change in control.  The pertinent contractual 
provisions involved the definition of a “Fundamental Change”:  
A “Fundamental Change” is defined in Section 1.01 of the 
Indenture to have occurred if, inter alia, “at any time the 
Continuing Directors do not constitute a majority of the 
Company’s Board of Directors . . . .”  The Indenture defines 
“Continuing Directors” as: 
(i) individuals who on the Issue Date constituted 
the Board of Directors and (ii) any new directors 
whose election to the Board of Directors or whose 
nomination for election by the stockholders of the 
Company was approved by at least a majority of 
the directors then still in office (or a duly 
constituted committee thereof) either who were 
directors on the Issue Date or whose election or 
nomination for election was previously so 
approved.222 
The question addressed was whether the board could “approve” someone 
who was not a board nominee, so that even if a board nominee lost, the winning 
candidate would still be a “continuing director.”223  To put it another way, could 
the board “approve” more than one person for a board position?   
It is certainly possible to view these redemption provisions as not really 
benefitting the noteholders but, rather, simply providing tools to fend-off hostile 
takeovers.  But, insofar as they are in fact designed to benefit noteholders, it 
would seem that the idea is the noteholders believe their likelihood of being 
repaid is enhanced where the current management continues to control the firm.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221   Id. at 315 n.30. 
222   Id. at 307-08 (footnotes omitted). 
223   Id. at 306. 
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In that case, a person viewed by the incumbent board as inferior should not be 
satisfactory—should not be a “continuing director.” 
Subsequent events would seem to show that the results of this 
interpretative approach are on-the-mark.  The terms of debt securities in four 
subsequent offerings involving Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, a prominent law firm 
involved in the issuance of notes at issue in the case, were reviewed.  The term 
“continuing director” is defined in each so that it clearly would no longer allow a 
person who was competing for a position with someone nominated by the board 
to be a “continuing director.”224 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224   See Indenture Among DISH DBS Corp., Guarantors & Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, (Dec. 
27, 2012), in DISH DBS Corp., Current Report on Form 8-K (Dec. 27, 2012) (“Continuing 
Director” means, as of any date of determination, any member of the Board of Directors of DISH 
Network Corporation who: (a) was a member of such Board of Directors on the date of this 
Indenture; or (b) was nominated for election or elected to such Board of Directors with the 
affirmative vote of a majority of the Continuing Directors who were members of such Board at 
the time of such nomination or election or was nominated for election or elected by the Principal 
and his Related Parties.”); AMC Networks, Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Dec. 10, 2012) 
(“‘Continuing Directors’ means, as of any date of determination, any member of the Board of 
Directors of the Company who:  (1) was a member of such Board of Directors on the date of 
initial issuance of the debt securities of the applicable series; or (2) was nominated for election or 
elected to such Board of Directors with the approval of a majority of the Continuing Directors 
who were members of such Board of Directors at the time of such nomination or election.”); First 
Supplemental Indenture Between Dunn & Bradstreet Corp. & Bank of N.Y. Mellon (Dec. 3, 
2012), in Dun & Bradstreet Corp., Current Report on Form 8-K (Nov. 25, 2012) (“‘Continuing 
Director’ means, as of any date of determination, any member of the board of directors of the 
Company who: (1) was a member of such board of directors on the date of the issuance of the 
Securities; or (2) was nominated for election or elected to such board of directors with the 
approval of a majority of the Continuing Directors who were members of such board of directors 
at the time of such nomination or election.”); Aetna, Inc., Form of Security (n.d.), in Aetna, Inc., 
Current Report on Form 8-K (Nov. 2, 2012) (“‘Continuing Directors’ means, as of any date of 
determination, any member of the Board of Directors of the Company who (1) was a member of 
the Board of Directors of the Company on the date of the issuance of the Notes; or (2) was 
nominated for election or elected to the Board of Directors of the Company with the approval of 
a majority of the Continuing Directors who were members of such Board of Directors of the 
Company at the time of such nomination or election (either by specific vote or by approval of the 
Company’s proxy statement in which such member was named as a nominee for election as a 
director).”). 
Note that a failure of the market to change language after a judicial interpretation does 
not necessarily mean the interpretation is consistent with the market’s expectation as to the 
meaning of the term.  In this case, it is relatively straight-forward to revise the language to clarify 
its meaning.  However, in other cases, it may not be, and a failure to change may reflect difficulty 
in adequately specifying an alternative treatment.  See generally MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, 
THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION 10-11 (2013)  (stating in examining a pari passu 
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5. Rejection of gray matter grinding argument   
The tedious literal argument does not always win the day.  In one of then-
Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Strine’s many memorable observations,225 Law 
Debenture Trust Co. of New York v. Petrohawk Energy Corp., the Chancellor described 
an argument for a literal interpretation of a covenant triggering redemption on a 
change in control as a “confusing and gray matter grinding argument.”226  
Illustrative of the tedious arguments that the bondholders made was that a 
voluntary transaction triggered a poison put, requiring that the issuer offer to 
redeem notes where a majority of its board did not constitute continuing directors 
(as defined).227  The court rejected an argument that the precise method of seating 
the directors resulted in some literal deficiency, noting that the purpose of the 
provision was to allow redemption where a non-consensual transaction occursed 
yet this one was consensual.228 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
clause in sovereign debt, “Boilerplate clauses—standardized clauses that have been used by rote 
over long periods of time—often remain unchanged, even when a court decision has created 
uncertainty regarding the clauses’ meaning.  In short, boilerplate clauses are sticky: They seem 
resistant to amendment even when amendment seems desirable.”); Kahan, supra note 34, at 1078 
(“Once a contractual term is widely employed, parties rationally may believe that others have 
studied the term and concluded that it operates well.  This may lead them to set aside their own 
view that the term is deficient and could be improved.”); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 185, at 
720-21 (making a similar point). 
Provisions concerning refinancing with lower interest rate debt are an example.  The 
original language at issue in, for example, Franklin Life Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 
F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Ill. 1978), aff’d, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1979), involved prohibitions on direct 
or indirect refunding.  See infra notes 255-264 and accompanying text.  The drafting problem is 
that it is difficult in advance to specify all the indirect ways a security can be refinanced with 
lower-interest-rate debt.  
225   See, e.g., In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“The world is 
diverse enough that it is conceivable that a mogul who needed to address an urgent debt situation 
at one of his coolest companies (say a sports team or entertainment or fashion business), would 
sell a smaller, less sexy, but fully solvent and healthy company in a finger snap (say two months) at 
75% of what could be achieved if the company sought out a wider variety of possible buyers, gave 
them time to digest non-public information, and put together financing.  In that circumstance, the 
controller’s personal need for immediate cash to salvage control over the financial tool that allows 
him to hang with stud athletes, supermodels, hip hop gods, and other pop culture icons, would 
have been allowed to drive corporate policy at the healthy, boring company and to have it be sold 
at a price less than fair market value, subjecting the minority to unfairness.”). 
226   No. Civ. A. 2422-VCS, 2007 WL 2248150, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2007). 
227   Id. 
228   Id.  
2014]   VESTIGIAL LITERALISM IN THE INTERPRETATION OF    297 
CORPORATE FINANCING INSTRUMENTS 
E. Conclusion 
This collection of authority illustrates the lack of predictability in the 
courts’ interpretation of corporate financing instruments.  Some authority 
subordinates a better literal reading to the evident purposes manifested by the 
language as a whole.  That is more likely to happen within certain classes of 
circumstances:  (i) where a comparable interpretative issue was not litigated long 
ago (e.g., modern subordination provisions); (ii) where the actions can be 
categorized as a common scheme of evasion, such as a step-transaction or a 
sham; or (iii) where the language is also used in a statute.  However, reference to 
purposes is inconsistent, so that they may be given effect in construction of such 
terms as anti-dilution and anti-destruction provisions, notice provisions, 
provisions for release of collateral, and limits on impairing rights to payment.  In 
addition, it would appear that the complexity of the transactions often causes 
courts to retreat to literalism in their construction. 
Predictability is also inhibited by the failure to reference contemporaneous 
documents memorializing parties’ intended meanings.  Courts construing 
corporate financing instruments further compound this unpredictability by not 
consistently omitting their reference to this material.  Lastly, that the instruments 
are complex appears sometimes to cause courts to retreat into tedious literalism, 
but not always.  In sum, predictability and consistency are not hallmarks of the 
collection of cases. 
IV.  DIFFERENCES IN INTERPRETATIVE APPROACHES 
Interpretating contractual agreements involves both reference to literal 
terms and reference to evident purposes, even if not the best literal reading.  In 
connection with all contractual interpretation, a balance is struck with literalism 
governing in some areas and purpose-based interpretations governing elsewhere.  
At some point, an attempt to implement claimed purposes will be so at odds with 
the directly pertinent literal language that a court will be unwilling to stray from 
the literal interpretation.  The preceding Part shows that where that balance is 
struck—the dividing line between interpretation based on the evident purposes 
and interpretation reflecting literalism—is different in connection with construing 
corporate financing instruments, as compared to other agreements, although that 
difference is not accompanied by increased certainty. 
However, this literalism issue is not the sole difference in interpretive 
approach applicable to corporate financing instruments.  This Part turns to two 
additional differences: the extent to which the contractual relationships are 
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construed against a particular party and what might be described as “abstraction” 
of contractual interpretation beyond the language initially construed—a 
somewhat complicated process described in more detail below. 
A. Contra Proferentem and the Like; Pro-Issuer Construction 
In a variety of contexts, interpretive principles are adjusted depending on 
the type of instrument involved.  For example, it is said that a guaranty is 
narrowly construed,229 and a deed is construed against the grantor.230 
Contra proferentem (construction of an ambiguous contractual provision 
against its draftsman) is a familiar principle of contract construction that applies 
interpretive principles based on the process by which a contract has been 
negotiated and documented.231  As the court in Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson 
noted, courts disagree over whether this principle applies to corporate financing 
agreements, stating “This reflects, in part, contrasting views regarding the 
respective roles played by underwriters and issuers.”232  In considering the 
application of this principle, courts express disagreement concerning the extent to 
which the participating investment banks represent investors during negotiation 
of the terms of the instruments.233  The Kaiser Aluminum court concluded, 
“[W]hen faced with an ambiguous provision in a document such as the 
Certificate, the Court must construe the document to adhere to the reasonable 
expectations of the investors who purchased the security and thereby subjected 
themselves to the terms of the contract.”234  On the other hand, other authority in 
Delaware provided, “Indentures are to be read strictly and to the extent they do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229   PERILLO, supra note 53, § 3.13, at 138. 
230   Id. 
231   See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981). 
232   681 A.2d 392, 398 (Del. 1996).  See generally Bratton, supra note 4, at 381 (noting that 
underwriters’ counsel typically drafts the indenture, and noting the problem with construing an 
indenture adverse to the underwriters). 
233   Kaiser Aluminum, 681 A.2d at 398-99. 
234   Id. at 399 (citing Rhone-Poulene Basic Chem. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 
1196 (Del. 1992)).  See also Kelly v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497, 503 
(S.D.N.Y. 1935) (“While, too, an instrument such as this, created and issued by [the issuer] is to be 
construed against it in case of doubt or ambiguity, nevertheless, it is to be fairly construed in the 
light of its context and of all of the surrounding circumstances.”), remanded, 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 
1936); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Commerzbank Capital Funding Trust II, 65 A.3d 539, 552 (Del. 
2013) (“[T]hat principle is properly applied as a ‘last resort,’ because the Defendants could have 
easily drafted the “hopelessly ambiguous” Parity Securities definition in the LLC Agreement in a 
straightforward manner. Yet they did not.” (footnote omitted)). 
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not expressly restrict the rights of the issuer, the issuer is left with the freedom to 
act, subject only to the boundaries of other positive law.” 235 
One might hazard that the distinction involves the type of corporate 
financing instrument:  that the principle of construction in favor of reasonable 
expectations of investors is limited to stock.  However, Kaiser Aluminum, a case 
that involved construction of preferred stock, rejected that distinction, 
referencing application of the principle to “bond contracts.”236  So, even within a 
single jurisdiction, there is inconsistency in application of this interpretative 
principle. 
Moreover, additional inconsistencies in the doctrine arise because some 
authority states that the principle of contra proferentem is inapplicable to 
construction of a corporate financing instrument,237 although other authority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235    San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 314 (Del. 
Ch.) (quoting In re Loral Space & Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Litig., Nos. 2808-VCS, 3022-VCS 2008 
WL 4293781, at *35 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008)), aff’d, 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009). 
236   Kaiser Aluminum, 681 A.2d at 398-99 (quoting Tauke, supra note 4, at 89). 
237   See Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 947 n.20 (5th Cir. 1981) (“While as a matter 
of abstract contract law it is proper to construe ambiguities against the drafter of a contract, that 
tenet of contract law has only limited practical significance in the context of construing an 
indenture.  To the extent the rule is practicable at all, it can only be readily applied to those terms 
that were actually discussed and thought about by the parties—which is almost never the case 
with boilerplate provisions such as the ones at issue here.”); Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer 
Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1541 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“Finally, we view this as a most 
inappropriate case to construe ambiguous contract language against the drafter.  The Indenture 
was negotiated by sophisticated bond counsel on both sides of the bargaining table.  There is no 
suggestion of disparate bargaining power in the drafting of the Indenture, nor could there be.  
Moreover, even if we were to adopt this rule, it is not at all clear that ADM would be considered 
the drafter of the Indenture, given the active participation of the managing underwriter.  Indeed, it 
is arguable that the ambiguous language should be construed in favor of ADM.”). 
The oft-cited Sharon Steel opinion provides a different interpretative approach:   
Where contractual language seems designed to protect the interests of both 
parties and where conflicting interpretations are argued, the contract should be 
construed to sacrifice the principal interests of each party as little as possible.  
An interpretation which sacrifices a major interest of one of the parties while 
furthering only a marginal interest of the other should be rejected in favor of an 
interpretation which sacrifices marginal interests of both parties in order to 
protect their major concerns.   
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1051 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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holds to the contrary.238  Certainly, a part of that conclusion derives from the 
difficulty in describing authorship of components of provisions, because there 
may be back-and-forth over individual drafts and a court may generally be 
reluctant to apply this principle to a contract drafted in that fashion, regardless of 
the type of contract.  In addition, there are difficulties in applying this principle to 
construction of corporate financing instruments, because securityholders often 
are not participants in the original drafting.239  
In counterpoint to the approach reflected in Kaiser Aluminum, other 
authority seems simply to reflect a bias against those providing the financing.  Beal 
Savings Bank v. Sommer240 exhibited a curious pro-issuer bent.  The court ultimately 
concluded that the holder of a syndication interest in a bank loan was not 
permitted to pursue remedies directly, where the remaining thirty-six syndicate 
members were of a different view.241  It is frankly surprising for a court to find an 
implied limit on a party’s right to maintain a claim—to impose a limit on the party 
that the action be approved by a majority of similarly situated persons.  By way of 
contrast, the Trust Indenture Act would render unenforceable an express attempt 
to limit direct action as to principal or interest (with minor exceptions) if the 
claimant holds registered debt securities.242  So, it is surprising for a court to have 
found some implied limit on the exercise of a remedy when in other 
circumstances, an express attempt to bargain for that result has been prohibited.  
Perhaps the best that can be said of this opinion is that the court is seeking to 
rescue the promisor from the improvident consequences of failing to have 
bargained expressly for protection from hold-outs. 
Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. provided a 
more recent illustration.243  Issuer’s counsel stumbled in seeking to implement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238   See R.A. Mackie & Co. v. Petrocorp Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 477, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating a 
warrant agreement would be construed against the issuer as the draftsman, applying Texas law); 
Metro. W. Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Magnus Funding, Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 5539(NRB), 2004 WL 
1444868, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2004) (construing against the draftsman); Wash. Cnty. Hous. 
& Redevelopment Auth. v. First Trust Nat’l Ass’n, No. C5-95-2119, 1996 WL 175433, at *3 
(Minn. Ct. App. June 19, 1996) (denying an exception to interpreting against the draftsman). 
239   See generally Stark et al., supra note 98, at 559-61 (noting underwriter conflict of interests in 
criticizing construction in favor of the issuer).  
240   865 N.E.2d 1210 (N.Y. 2007). 
241   Id. at 1211. 
242   See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
243   No. 13 Civ. 1582 (PAE), 2013 WL 1890278 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013). 
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changes from ordinary redemption provisions.  Paragraph (b) of section 1.7 of a 
supplemental indenture provided: 
(b) At any time from and including November 15, 2012 to and 
including March 15, 2013 (the “Special Early Redemption Period”), the 
Company, at its option, may redeem the Notes . . . .  The 
Company shall be permitted to exercise its option to redeem the 
Notes pursuant to this Section 1.7 so long as it gives the notice of 
redemption pursuant to Section 3.04 of the Base Indenture during 
the Special Early Redemption Period. Any redemption pursuant 
to this Section 1.7(b) shall be conducted, to the extent applicable, 
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 3.02 through 3.07 of the 
Base Indenture.244 
Section 3.04 of the base indenture required the issuer to provide 
bondholders at least thirty-day’s advance notice of any redemption.245  The issuer 
sought a declaratory judgment that it was permitted to effect a redemption as long 
as the notice was issued on or before March 15, 2013.246 
The drafting was simply a mistake.  A typical way to draft redemption 
provisions contemplates that the draftsman identify the time-period in which the 
securities are redeemable in a first provision, and then provide whatever advance 
notice is required in a second provision.  For idiosyncratic reasons, this issuer 
sought to change this standard approach by identifying whether the securities 
were redeemable based on the time that the notice was issued, as opposed to the 
date of the redemption.247  To draft this alternative scheme properly, the first 
sentence needs to be revised so that reference to the redeemability is based not on 
the dates of redemption but, instead, allows redemption as long as the notice of 
redemption is given by a particular time.   
Interestingly, press reports quoted a senior person affiliated with the bank 
leading the offering to the effect that the offering had an “8-percent-plus IRR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244   Id. at *2. 
245   Indenture among Chesapeake Energy Corp., Subsidiary Guarantors & Bank of N.Y. Mellon 
Trust Co. 24, in Chesapeake Energy Corp., Registration Statement on Form S-3 (Aug. 2, 2010) 
(“At least 30 days but not more than 60 days before a redemption date, the Company shall mail a 
notice of redemption by first-class mail to each Holder of Securities to be redeemed at such 
Holder’s registered address.”). 
246   Chesapeake Energy, 2013 WL 1890278, at *1. 
247   Id. 
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[internal rate of return],” though an expert computed securities bearing that rate 
of return required redemption (not notice of redemption, but redemption itself) 
not later than May 15, 2013.248 
The court simply rescued the issuer from its drafting mistake. 
In addition to this informal interpretative bias against investors, two 
formal interpretative principles create uncertainty, typically weighing against the 
investors.  One, mentioned above,249 is the Doctrine of Independent Legal 
Significance.  The second is that, where the corporate financing instrument is 
preferred stock, Delaware authority requires the preferences be “expressly and 
clearly stated” and “not be presumed or implied.”250  As the Court of Chancery 
recently noted, there is tension between this interpretive principle and the 
Delaware approach, which requires construction in favor of the reasonable 
expectations of the investors.251  Illustrating the indeterminacy of the law, there 
has been some change over time concerning the standard for assessing the clarity 
of expression of differences.  In 1990, the Delaware Supreme Court indicated 
putative differences were to be “strictly construed” as in derogation of the 
common law default that all stock is equal,252 a test the Delaware Supreme Court 
softened only eight years later.253 
B. Abstraction of Interpretation:  Interpretation Divorced from Language or Context 
Another anomaly in the construction of corporate financing agreements 
involves what may be termed “abstraction”—a process in which interpretations 
are based on considering precedent or the contract language in the abstract and 
disregarding facts or contractual language that would seem relevant.  A series of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248   Expert Report of James A. Mullin at 11-12, Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon 
Trust Co., No. 13-cv-101582 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013). 
249   See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
250   Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Del. 1998) (“Any rights, 
preferences and limitations of preferred stock that distinguish that stock from common stock 
must be expressly and clearly stated, as provided by statute. Therefore, these rights, preferences 
and limitations will not be presumed or implied.” (footnote omitted)). 
251   See Shiftan v. Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., 57 A.3d 928, 936 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
252   See Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1134-35 (Del. 1990) (citing numerous cases holding 
that stock preferences are to be strictly construed). 
253   See Elliott Assocs., 715 A.2d at 853 n.46 (continuing to approve Waggoner but determining that 
the use of “strict construction” was problematic). 
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cases extended the precedent to contexts that the initial authority would seem to 
indicate would be distinguishable.254 
1. Covenants limiting refinancing with lower-cost funds   
Franklin Life involved a claim that an issuer in 1972 violated restrictions 
on redemption of preferred stock issued in 1970.255  The terms of the preferred 
stock stated that none of the stock “may be redeemed through refunding, directly 
or indirectly, by or in anticipation of the incurring of any debt [having a lower 
interest rate].”256  The prospectus for the preferred stock declared a need for 
approximately $1 billion of capital to fund planned construction that was 
expected to be raised through further securities sales.257  Consistent with that plan, 
in 1971, the issuer incurred over $1 billion of debt.258  It was all, however, below 
the triggering interest rate.259  In March 1972, the issuer redeemed the preferred 
stock, applying segregated proceeds from the sale of common stock and 
warrants.260  The court found, after a bench trial,261 the issuer did not breach the 
contractual terms of the preferred stock.262 
The court’s analysis distinguished between the following prohibitions: (1) 
preferred stock cannot be redeemed “in anticipation of debt,” and (2) preferred 
stock cannot be redeemed “through refunding in anticipation of debt.”263  The 
opinion stated version (1) would have been breached.  However, the actual terms, 
corresponding to version (2), were not breached, because common stock “cannot 
be refunded.”264  It would appear that the analysis was that any low-interest debt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254   See Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Ill. 1978), 
aff’d, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1979); Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. 
Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., No. 9032, 1988 
WL 63491 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1988). 
255   Franklin Life, 451 F. Supp. at 604. 
256   Id. at 613. 
257   Id. at 605. 
258   Id. 
259   Id. at 606. 
260   Id. at 606. 
261   Id. at 604. 
262   Id. at 616. 
263   Id. at 614. 
264   Id. at 614 (“Were it not for ‘refunding’, plaintiffs’ argument would be persuasive.”). 
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cannot “refund” the common stock whose proceeds were directly used to redeem 
the preferred stock.  This distinction is important because, as will be seen, this 
crucial justification for the outcome is later disregarded.265  
In reaching its conclusion, the court considered expert testimony from a 
former director of underwriting at a well-known investment bank.266  The expert 
stated this type of provision was originally used in issuance of bonds in the 1930s 
and 1940s, and that such a provision “was designed to prevent this type of 
redemption, but not to prevent the redemption out of an issue of common 
stock.”267  The court ultimately disregarded the evidence, finding trade 
understandings in the bond market unpersuasive in construing preferred stock 
terms.268 
The opinion noted that the securityholders “believed redemption could 
not be accomplished so long as defendant was a ‘net borrower’, that is, had 
borrowed more money per year than it repaid.”269  However, the court also noted 
that the issuer must have intended to retain some right of redemption.270  It 
further found that any redemption would have been highly unlikely under the 
plaintiffs’ interpretation.271  The court concluded, “Thus, plaintiffs’ interpretation 
in effect would render the stock uncallable prior to August 1, 1980.  If this were 
[the issuer’s] intent it could have been achieved with a great deal less words.”272 
The court’s analysis in Franklin Life does not seem to reflect the proper 
interpretative approach.  Instead of focusing on the burden arising from the 
express provision, the focus should be on what benefit the provision was 
designed to provide.  Recall that the implied covenant of good faith is often 
phrased in terms of assuring that “neither party deprives the other of ‘the fruits of 
the agreement’” or providing a remedy where a party “seeks . . . to withhold [the 
contract’s] benefits.”273 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265   See infra notes 275-278 and accompanying text. 
266   Franklin Life, 451 F. Supp. at 609. 
267   Id. 
268   Id. at 615-16. 
269   Id. at 608. 
270   Id. at 615. 
271   Id. 
272   Id. 
273   See supra  notes 83, 85 and accompanying text. 
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Franklin Life referenced a different method of interpretation depending on 
whether the provision was found in preferred stock or bonds.274  Subsequent 
authority produced results inconsistent with the basis of the original decision.  
Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co. involved a covenant with the 
following prohibition: “[T]he Company may not redeem any of the Debentures 
pursuant to such option from the proceeds, or in anticipation, of the issuance of 
any indebtedness for money borrowed [at specified interest rates].”275   
Recall from above that Franklin Life indicated two factors were important 
in determining whether the redemption was permitted: (1) that the redeemed 
securities were not bonds (for which there was a relevant trade practice), and (2) 
that the pertinent covenant did not prohibit redemption merely “in anticipation 
of debt,” but, rather, prohibited redemption “through refunding … by or in 
anticipation of the incurring of any debt [having a lower interest rate].”276  These 
factors were not present in Archer Daniels.277  Nevertheless, the Archer Daniels court 
held the plaintiffs failed to show a sufficient likelihood of success to grant 
preliminary injunctive relief.278 
Franklin and Archer Daniels illustrate a pattern of contract interpretation, in 
which: (1) a court first interprets some provision, relying on the precise language 
or the context to support the conclusion; and (2) another court in another case 
elides the basis for that initial decision and extends the interpretative outcome to 
a case where the significant context or particulars in language are not present.  
Though the Archer Daniels court justified its outcome as necessary to avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274   See Franklin Life, 451 F. Supp. at 616 (“[W]ere the redemption provisions contained in a 
corporate bond, the expert testimony would be more relevant and more persuasive.  But the issue 
here is preferred stock.”). 
275   570 F. Supp. 1529, 1531 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
276   451 F. Supp. at 611, 613 616. 
277   See 570 F. Supp. 1529. 
278   Id. at 1536.  See also Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., No. 9032, 1988 WL 
63491 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1988) (reaching a similar result involving a multipart-funding with both 
the issuance of debt and equity).  The court also found a similar covenant not violated.  See generally 
William A. Klein et al., The Call Provision of Corporate Bonds:  A Standard Form in Need of Change, 18 J. 
CORP. L. 653, at 686-87 (1993) (“[T]he typical nonrefunding provision that has been used in the 
past is largely ineffective for the simple and obvious reason that money is fungible and that, 
consequently, a borrower that is willing to incur some transaction costs can avoid the 
nonrefunding stricture.”). 
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“intolerable uncertainty in the capital markets,”279 extending a call provision’s 
authority beyond its express contours does not achieve that result. 
One cannot simply conclude, however, that corporate financing terms 
limiting refinancing are interpreted with tedious literalism.  Other case law over 
eighty years old seems to emphasize the evident purposes in allowing a 
refinancing.280 
2. Parkinson and anti-destruction protection   
In addition to these and other cases that followed Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., one can identify three similar circumstances where courts 
have extended a provision’s authority beyond its original, well-circumscribed 
contours.  In Parkinson v. West End St. Ry. Co.,281 the court held that an issuer’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279   570 F. Supp. at 1542 (“Given the paramount interest in uniformly construing boilerplate 
provisions, and for all the other reasons stated above and in our prior Opinion, we chose to 
follow the holding in Franklin.”). 
280   Kelly v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), remanded, 85 F.2d 
61 (2d Cir. 1936), elsewhere described as “[t]he great pathological decision of the depression era,” 
Bratton, supra note 4, at 391 n.67, examines a covenant restricting incurrence of “additional 
indebtedness.”  11 F. Supp. at 502 n.3.  The District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted, dismissed claims that an issuer violated 
a negative pledge and violated a provision limiting the incurrence of indebtedness.  85 F.2d at 62.  
The finding on the latter point is of interest.   
As to renewals of short-term debt upon its maturity, at times at a higher interest rate, see 
Kelly, 11 F. Supp. at 504-05, the district court found, “No ‘additional indebtedness’ is ‘created’ or 
‘assumed’ by the renewal of a loan; those phrases, taken together, connote extension in amount, 
not extension in time.  The obvious purpose of the covenant was to prevent an increase in [the 
issuer’s] total liabilities, not to prevent postponement of the payment of an old liability . . . .  That 
the interest rates were increased in consideration of the renewals is immaterial; the covenant 
relates to the creation and not to the cost of carrying the principal of the indebtedness.” 
This outcome makes the word “additional” carry a lot of water, particularly where the 
court makes express reference to construing ambiguous debt provisions against the issuer. See 
supra note 234.  If one wishes to exclude renewals on maturity from the scope of a covenant 
limiting incurrence of indebtedness, it is certainly easy so to provide expressly.  See Kelly, 11 F. 
Supp. at 503.  And a bondholder is certainly not indifferent where the new indebtedness is at a 
higher interest rate.  Notwithstanding the ease of clarifying the right to renew, the court found 
that the agreement had the meaning that could have been easily clarified, id. (and one that one 
would have expected to have been so clarified had the matter been considered). 
In remanding, the Second Circuit directed the district court to make findings on a matter 
relevant to another clause (a negative pledge) and to determine whether subsequent lenders had 
knowledge of the covenants.  85 F.2d at 63.  No further opinions are reported.  The remand, 
therefore, seemingly did not call into question the district court’s determination as to renewals. 
281   53 N.E. 891, 892-93 (Mass. 1899). 
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successor by consolidation was not in breach for failure to deliver preferred stock 
on maturity of bonds, even though the predecessor issuer had undertaken to do 
so.  The court stated: 
A consolidation which makes no arrangement for furnishing stock 
in the new company, and which ends the existence of the old 
ones, as a general rule may be presumed to put an end to the right 
of bondholders to call for stock, not because the law has not 
machinery for keeping such a right alive, but because, not being 
bound to do so, it has made dispositions which manifestly take no 
account of the right.282 
Earlier authority from the same court, John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Worcester, N. & R. R. Co., relied on statutory language to affirm a determination 
that convertible bonds, following what the opinion described as a 
“consolidation,” remained convertible.283  In the Parkinson court’s view, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282   Id.  Parkinson now appears long-settled law.  See Buxbaum, supra note 129, at 287.  It is 
interesting to note that, three decades after it was decided, Berle references an approach at odds 
with the case: 
Many covenants in support of conversion or stock purchase warrants explicitly 
state this rule[, adjusting conversion rights where the authorized capital is 
changed,] at present. Particularly where the privilege may be exercised in 
respect of stock without nominal or par value . . . it is frequently provided that 
the conversion privilege may be exercised in respect of a greater number of 
shares in the event of any splitting of units. It is believed that these specific 
covenants merely state the rule which a court of equity would enforce in any 
event. The fact that the conversion privilege uses a name which is applicable to 
the shares both before and after the splitting-up process, can hardly be 
construed to give the obligor corporation liberty to evade its promise by 
completely altering the unit value of the share. 
A. A. Berle, Jr., Convertible Bonds and Stock Purchase Warrants, 36 YALE L.J. 649, 655 (1927) (footnote 
omitted) (citing John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Worcester R.R., 21 N. E. 364, 364-65 
(Mass. 1889) (statute providing successor in consolidation of two railroads subject to all duties, 
debts, obligations, etc. of either caused convertible bondholder of successor not to lose 
conversion right upon consolidation; expressly limiting the analysis to this particular 
consolidation)); Gay v. Burgess Mills, 74 A. 714 (R.I. 1909)).  But see Broad v. Rockwell Int’l 
Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Justice Holmes’ decision in Parkinson was aptly cited by 
the authors of the Commentaries for the proposition that antidilution protection must be 
provided by contract if it is to be provided at all, for Parkinson holds that there is no such 
protection at common law.”).  Buxbaum’s 1954 article indicates that, as of that time, Berle’s view 
had been rejected.  See Buxbaum, supra note 129, at 282 (indicating an adjustment for a split will 
not be implied). 
283   21 N.E. 364, 364-65 (Mass. 1889). 
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different outcomes in these two cases resulted from different levels of “intimacy” 
between the pairs of constituent corporations.284  On the basis of the curious 
authority of Parkinson, modern courts continue to interpret typical corporate 
financing instruments as not having implied anti-destruction protection.285  
However, balancing the “intimacy” of the constituent corporations appears no 
longer in vogue.286 
3. No-recourse provisions:  LaSalle   
Another illustration is provided by LaSalle National Bank v. Perelman.287  
The court made reference to the construction of no-recourse provisions based on 
the general purposes of such provisions as opposed to the actual agreed-upon 
language of the no-recourse provision being litigated.288  Language in Bank of New 
York Mellon Trust Co. v. Liberty Media Corp. is to a similar effect.289 
4. Successor liability:  Liberty Media   
Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Liberty Media Corp.290 involved an odd 
illustration of abstraction of the analysis presented in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284   53 N.E. 891, 892. 
285   See, e.g., Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1417 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) (“[A] 
corporation is under no duty to act for the benefit of its debentureholders, or to refrain from 
action which dilutes their interest, except as provided in the indenture.”).  
286   No other pertinent case was found in the following Westlaw search:  Parkinson  & (merge! or 
consolidat!) & intimacy (Westlaw, ALLCASES database) (Feb. 10, 2013).  The search revealed six 
other cases, which involved criminal or anti-trust or other matters not relevant to this subject. 
287   141 F. Supp. 2d 451 (D. Del. 2001). 
288   As noted above, see supra note 122 and accompanying text, in rejecting a claim that language 
construed in a prior case was materially different (based on whether the term “hereunder” was 
included), the LaSalle opinion stated: 
[T]he [Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 n. 6 (Del. Ch. 
1992), court did not rely on the word ‘hereunder’ or any specific language of 
the provision in limiting the provision to contract claims. Instead, the Chancery 
Court generally held that no recourse provisions are limited to contract claims . 
. . . 
141 F. Supp. 2d at 461. 
289   29 A.3d 225, 241 (Del. 2011) (“[I]n interpreting boilerplate indenture provisions, ‘courts will 
not look to the intent of the parties, but rather the accepted common purposes of such 
provisions.’”); see supra note 186. 
290   29 A.3d at 237-39. 
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Manhattan Bank.291  Sharon Steel involved a firm whose shareholders approved a 
plan of liquidation.292  An initial step in that liquidation was the sale of one of its 
three lines of business.293  Later that year, the issuer entered into agreements to 
dispose of its remaining assets in separate transactions.294  The opinion noted that 
various indentures contained “a ‘successor obligor’ provision allowing [the issuer] 
to assign its debt to a corporate successor which purchases ‘all or substantially all’ 
of [the company]’s assets.  If the debt is not assigned to such a purchaser, [the 
company] must pay off the debt.”295  The issuer sought to substitute the last buyer 
as a successor obligor.296  Judgment was rendered in favor of the bondholders, 
holding that the final sale was not a sale of substantially all the issuer’s assets, but 
was simply one part of a multi-step transaction.297  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit affirmed.298 
Liberty Media, however, abstracted the outcome of Sharon Steel to control 
the construction of an indenture having materially different language.  The Liberty 
Media indenture made express reference in the successor obligor provision to 
application to a “series of transactions”299—language not included in the Sharon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291   691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982). 
292   Id. at 1045. 
293   Id. at 1046. 
294   Id. at 1046-47 
295   Id. at 1044-45. 
296   Id. at 1046-47. 
297   Id. at 1051. 
298   Id. at 1053. 
299   The relevant language in question was somewhat anomalous: 
[Liberty Sub] shall not consolidate with or merge into, or sell, assign, transfer, 
lease, convey or other[wise] dispose of all or substantially all of its assets and 
the properties and the assets and properties of its Subsidiaries (taken as a 
whole) to, any entity or entities (including limited liability companies) unless: 
(1) the successor entity or entities . . .  shall expressly assume, by an indenture 
(or indentures, if at such time there is more than one Trustee) supplemental 
hereto executed by the successor Person and delivered to the Trustee, the due 
and punctual payment of the principal of, any premium and interest on and any 
Additional Amounts with respect to all the Securities and the performance of 
every obligation in this Indenture and the Outstanding Securities on the part of 
[Liberty Sub] to be performed or observed . . . ; 
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Steel indenture.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that as to the question of 
whether multiple transactions should be integrated for purposes of interpreting 
successor obligor provisions, the two indentures should be construed as having 
the same meaning.  The language referring to a “series of transactions” in the 
Liberty Media indenture was essentially read out because the language in the Liberty 
Media indenture was, in the court’s view, not sufficiently different from the 
language in the Sharon Steel indentures: 
Liberty’s Indenture was executed many years after the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Sharon Steel.  There is no evidence in the 
record that the “series” language was included for any reason 
other than to clarify that the Successor Obligor Provision should 
be interpreted in the same manner as the one at issue in Sharon 
Steel.  The trial testimony established—and the Trustee admits—
that the Successor Obligor Provision was never a subject of 
negotiations between the parties in the case. Had the parties to the 
Indenture intended to create an asset disposition covenant with a 
broader scope than the standard, boilerplate successor obligor 
covenant, it was incumbent upon them to include it in a separate, 
negotiated covenant. As two commentators have noted: 
Sharon Steel illustrates the narrow construction of 
indenture provisions and the underlying concerns 
that inform the interpretation of indenture 
provisions by the courts. It is therefore important 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2) immediately after giving effect to such transaction or series of transactions, 
no Event of Default or event which, after notice or lapse of time, or both, 
would become an Event of Default, shall have occurred and be continuing; and 
(3) either [Liberty Sub] or the successor Person shall have delivered to the 
Trustee an Officers’ Certificate and an Opinion of Counsel [containing certain 
statements required by Section 801]. 
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 29 A.3d 225, 229 (Del. 2011).   
The anomaly was that the reference to a “series of transactions” is in clause (2).  It is not 
clear why the language did not include “in one transaction or a series of transactions” immediately 
before “unless” (the last word before clause (1)).  The Liberty Media court did not seem to find this 
oddity relevant; rather, it focused on whether the reference to a “series” of transactions meant 
something other than the kind of series at issue in Sharon Steel.  See id. at 235-36  (“The parties 
dispute whether Liberty will breach the Successor Obligor Provision by disposing of substantially 
all its assets in a series of transactions. It is undisputed, however, that the Capital Splitoff, standing 
alone, does not constitute “substantially all” of Liberty’s assets.  The threshold question is, 
therefore, whether the Capital Splitoff should be aggregated with the prior spinoffs of LMI and 
Discovery and the splitoff of LEI.”). 
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that negotiated provisions in an indenture be not 
only explicit but also distinct from boilerplate provisions. 
Modifications to common indenture provisions 
will unlikely yield additional rights as courts will not 
look to the intent of the parties, but rather the 
accepted common purpose of such provisions. 
* * * 
[W]e conclude that the principles articulated in Sharon Steel are the 
proper basis for determining, under New York law, the nature and 
degree of interrelationship that will warrant aggregation of 
otherwise separate and individual transactions as a part of a 
“series.”  In Sharon Steel, the Second Circuit determined that 
aggregation is appropriate only when a series of transactions are 
part of a “plan of piecemeal liquidation” and “an overall scheme 
to liquidate” and not where each transaction stands on its own 
merits without reference to the others.300 
Note that Sharon Steel itself did not actually address the issue presented by 
Liberty Media.301  Sharon Steel found that multiple transactions pursuant to an 
approved plan of liquidation, occurring within one year, were to be integrated.302  
It did not speak to the issue in Liberty Media of whether multiple transactions 
occurring over more than half a decade, not pursuant to a determination to 
liquidate, were to be integrated.303  
There are now multiple sources of form language.  They include the 
Commentaries,304 the Model Simplified Indenture,305 the Revised Model Simplified 
Indenture306 and the Model Negotiated Covenants and Related Definitions.307  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300   Id. at 242-43 (quoting Dennis Connolly & William Hao, X Marks the Spot: Contractual 
Interpretation of Indenture Provisions, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6, Art. 1, 12 (2008) (emphasis added by 
the court)) (footnote omitted). 
301   See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982). 
302   Id. at 1051. 
303   29 A.3d at 227, 235 (final transaction announced in 2010, referenced as the “fourth major 
distribution of assets since March 2004”). 
304   AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 111. 
305   AM. BAR ASS’N, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 BUS. LAW. 741 (1982-83). 
306   Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of the 1983 Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 211. 
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Under the Liberty Media approach, language that is similar to that contained in one 
of these models will be construed as if the language from the model were 
included, ignoring any differences as long as the language is similar.308 
These cases reflect unrealistic expectations concerning the drafting of 
these types of agreements.309  In this author’s experience, one drafts agreements 
focusing on the pertinent language, which may be taken from a source of form 
documentation such as the Commentaries, but is often simply taken from some 
previous deal, a process which does not indicate whether the language is based on 
something from a form.  One drafts such agreements starting with language used 
in a prior transaction and modifiying it for the deal at hand.  It was not this 
author’s experience that the drafting of each individual covenant was the subject 
of research to determine whether the language initially was set forth in some 
model such as the Commentaries.  Under the Liberty Media approach, such a drafting 
method might significantly influence a judicial interpretation of the covenant.  
Given the proliferation of forms, such extensive research is likely to be 
prohibitively expensive. 
Even if one were aware of the origin of the language used in an 
agreement, the editorial changes required by the Liberty Media court to change the 
meaning of the language are unreasonable.310  It is not clear what constitutes a 
“separate” covenant.  Must it be a separate sentence or a separate section?  Why 
must one create a “separate” covenant to alter the meaning from language in a 
form, regardless of whether a separate sentence or a separate section is required?  
Why must it be “negotiated”?  Why must it be ineffective if it is included in an 
initial draft and never objected to by the parties?  And how can the question of 
whether it was “negotiated” be harmonized with the common view that these 
types of documents are construed based on the language used, eschewing 
reference to the negotiations that cannot be observed by subsequent traders in 
the securities?311  This approach to contract interpretation substantially impedes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307   Comm. on Trust Indentures & Indenture Trs., Model Negotiated Covenants and Related Definitions, 
61 BUS. LAW. 1439 (2006). 
308   See Liberty Media, 29 A.3d at 242 (“Modification to common indenture provisions will unlikely 
yield additional rights as courts will not look to the intent of the parties, but rather the accepted 
common purpose of such provisons.” (emphasis in original)). 
309   See generally Kahan & Klausner, supra note 185, at 765 (“Ambiguity in the customized term 
should be resolved to give the term a meaning distinct from that of its standard counterpart.” 
(emphasis added)). 
310   See 29 A.3d at 242 (“[I]t was incumbent upon them to include it in a separate, negotiated 
covenant.”). 
311   See supra Part III.C. 
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the ability of those negotiating to draft language that can be interpreted as the 
draftsman intends. 
C. Conclusion 
This Part collects a few additional idiosyncrasies in the interpretation of 
corporate financing instruments.  Courts are inconsistent in determining whether 
the instruments should be construed against a particular party and, if so, against 
which party.  Such inconsistencies provide a source of great uncertainty.  This 
Part also illustrates a curious abstraction that is at times applied in the 
construction of corporate financing instruments.  The language used is sometimes 
construed as an abstract contract, divorced from the actual, negotiated language.  
Such an interpretative approach impedes the ability of draftsmen to document 
transactions in language that a court will give the intended effect.  This is 
particularly curious when one considers that these instruments are often drafted 
by highly sophisticated counsel with substantial expertise in the field; the 
approach certainly cannot be considered as enhancing the ex-ante predictability of 
the negotiated terms. 
V. CONCLUSION:  FAILURE TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE OF ENHANCED 
PREDICTABILITY; DEFERENCE INHIBITING DIVERSIFICATION 
Assorted authority provides for an anomalous, enhanced literalism in the 
interpretation of corporate financing instruments, putatively to assure needed 
predictability in the interpretation of these agreements.  As these principles are 
implemented in fact, they do not yield predictability.  Courts more frequently 
settle with vestigial literalism when dealing with agreements that involve corporate 
financing transactions.  But they do not do so consistently. In the end, 
predictability is not achieved, and draftsmen are left with the additional 
disadvantage of the persistence of interpretative norms that in other contexts 
have been discarded as undesirable. 
Some modern authority interpreting corporate financing instruments 
conventionally applies modern interpretative principles, such as a recent case 
restraining a lender that sought to evade limits on assignment of the loan by 
conveying a participation.312  Part III.A also collects modern interpretative 
approaches in the construction of subordination provisions, as well as no-action 
and no-recourse provisions.  It also identifies authority implementing modern 
interpretations where a court categorizes challenged acts as a sham or a prohibited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312   See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text. 
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step transaction.  Vestigial literalism may also be rejected in construction of 
contract language paralleling statutory provisions that also may be construed.  
However, as shown in the remainder of Part III, implementation of modern 
interpretative principles emphasizing the evident purposes is intermittent and 
unpredictable.   
Accompanying this enhanced literalism is an increased deference to 
precedent, including precedent from other jurisdictions, often justified for the 
same reasons.  Somewhat ironically given the literalism applied in some contexts, 
terms of corporate financing agreements are at times abstracted in the course of 
interpretation.  An atypically enhanced specificity, of an inadequately identified 
scope, may be required to draft provisions that will be interpreted by courts as 
effecting an election to create terms different from those that were the subject of 
prior construction, whether by a court or by the authors of model forms.  
Because it is often not practicable during the negotiation of corporate financing 
transactions to trace the precise origins of language, and compare it to all these 
other sources, this approach decreases the ability of draftsmen to reflect the 
intended bargain in the terms of corporate financing contracts.  Any increase in 
ex post certainty is at the expense of decreased ex ante certainty.  This anomalous 
interpretative approach, which increasingly relies on vestigial literalism that 
depends on interpretations from long ago, coupled with the path-dependence of 
current interpretative doctrine applied to corporate financing instruments, creates 
a framework that often makes it impracticable for a draftsman to assure 
contemplated contract language will achieve the intended results. 
Consider the following example: An issuer proposes to take an action that 
a majority of bondholders believes to be unpermitted—an allegedly improper 
dividend.  A no-action clause allows holders of some percentage of securities to 
bring a lawsuit after some period of time following an unsuccessful demand that 
the trustee sue.  The issuer gives little advance notice of the dividend.  Under the 
literal terms of the no-action clause, if the trustee declines to sue, the 
bondholders’ right to sue will only mature after the dividend has been made. 
Is this a circumstance where a court will emphasize the evident purposes 
of the provision (avoidance of inconsistent enforcement and action brought as a 
mere strike-suit by one without a real interest—concerns that are likely ill-
founded when it is a majority of bondholders who wish to sue)?  Will 
construction in light of evident purposes be applied to these provisions, avoiding 
the possibility that the ability to litigate a bona fide claim will be lost, as in U.S. 
Bank?  Or will the court retreat to literalism?  Akanthos Capital Management, LLC v. 
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CompuCredit Holdings Corp. provided the latter answer.313  In that case, a lawsuit 
was initiated and sought to enjoin an allegedly improper dividend from being 
effected before the bondholders could sue directly.314  The outcome of such a 
case, at least in that circuit, is now clear.  However, the outcome was not 
predictable, at least to this author, with any amount of confidence.315 
The framework for interpreting these instruments does not yield a process 
that provides predictable outcomes.  As each new dispute arises, a student of 
these interpretative principles cannot confidently predict the outcome a court will 
reach.  The problems are even greater for those tasked with documenting these 
types of transactions.  The current process ultimately results in outcomes that are 
less likely to be correct and limits the ability of bondholders to diversify their risk.  
This author would commend enhanced reference to the evident purposes 
manifested by the instruments taken as a whole, a method articulated by some 
courts.316  Where one cannot identify a plausible reason why parties would have 
bargained for the outcome dictated by a literal parsing of individual provisions, 
giving effect to the evident purposes manifested by the agreement as a whole is 
well-justified.  This author further commends the budding retrenchment from 
enhanced deference to precedent in construction of these instruments. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313   677 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2012). 
314   Id. at 1297. 
315   Another example is Law Debenture Trust Co. v. Maverick Tube Corp., 595 F.3d 458, 471-72 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (American Depositary Shares not treated as common stock for purposes of covenant 
triggered by change in control; hypothetical bargain rationale for this treatment of American 
Depositary Shares not provided). 
316   See, e.g., supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
